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The relationship between the conscious experience of physical symptoms and indicators of 
objective physiological dysfunction is highly variable and depends on characteristics of the 
person, the context and their interaction. This relationship often breaks down entirely in the 
case of “medically unexplained” or functional somatic symptoms, violating the basic 
assumption in medicine that physical symptoms have physiological causes. In this paper, we 
describe the prevailing theoretical approach to this problem and review the evidence 
pertaining to it. We then use the framework of predictive coding to propose a new and more 
comprehensive model of the body-symptom relationship that integrates existing concepts 
within a unifying framework that addresses many of the shortcomings of current theory. We 
describe the conditions under which a close correspondence between the experience of 
symptoms and objective physiology might be expected, and when they are likely to diverge. 
We conclude by exploring some theoretical and clinical implications of this new account.   




1. The Disease Model And Medically Unexplained Symptoms 
Standard medical practice is premised on a disease model that typically comprises two 
phases. The diagnostic phase begins when symptoms are reported to a physician, who looks 
to determine their cause through history taking, physical examination and, where appropriate, 
medical investigations. This information, which mainly concerns the patient’s body, is 
mapped onto a set of pathophysiological criteria that allow for diagnosis and treatment. In the 
therapeutic phase, the aim is to remedy dysfunction and thereby remove the patient’s 
symptoms.  
This apparently logical process is often successful, but it sometimes fails dramatically. A 
particularly compelling (and common) example of this is when the patient reports symptoms 
despite tests indicating that their body is healthy, or where “successful” treatment for 
diagnosed disease fails to resolve symptoms. In such cases, doctors often make renewed 
attempts to identify disease, reflecting one of the fundamental assumptions of this model: that 
physical symptoms have physiological causes, and can therefore be reduced to them. If the 
symptoms persist but a disease cause remains elusive, then the patient may be given a 
diagnosis that simply describes their complaint (e.g., chronic fatigue) or another label that 
identifies them as suffering from “medically unexplained symptoms” (MUS). Although the 
biopsychosocial model has ensured that symptoms are no longer seen as purely biological 
phenomena, medical practice continues to be dominated by the view that “real” symptoms 
reflect bodily dysfunction, and that those symptoms that cannot be validated objectively are 
“in the mind” or simply made up. 
 In this paper, we draw on previous approaches to develop a novel model of symptom 
perception that transcends the artificial distinction between "explained" and "unexplained" 
physical symptoms, whilst explaining the variable relationship between symptoms and 
physiological dysfunction. The central principle underpinning this account is that physical 
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symptoms, as felt and expressed by patients, are not a direct record of bodily activity, but an 
inference based on implicit predictions about interoceptive information, derived from prior 
knowledge. An important implication of this account is that symptoms often result from an 
"inferential leap", resulting in an experience that is only loosely coupled with dysfunctional 
processes in the peripheral body, and occasionally has no relationship at all. We use this 
framework to describe the conditions under which a close correspondence between subjective 
symptoms and objective physiology might be expected, and when the two are likely to 
diverge. We conclude by exploring some clinical and empirical implications.  
1.1. Extent and Varieties of MUS 
Physical symptoms that occur in the absence of detectable physiological dysfunction are 
ubiquitous. In a population-based study in Germany (N=2,552), for example, 81.6% of people 
reported at least one medically unexplained symptom causing at least mild impairment 
(Hiller, Rief, & Brähler, 2006). In primary care, up to three quarters of all symptoms reported 
are thought not to be attributable to organic disease. About 25% of general practice patients 
have clinically relevant MUS (e.g., Fink, Toft, Hansen, Ornbol, & Olesen, 2007; Körber et 
al., 2011) and 8-10% of primary care patients have a history of multiple, distressing MUS 
(e.g., Kroenke et al., 1997). Symptom burden in individuals with MUS seems to be 
continuously distributed, ranging from non-consulting people with minimal disability 
(Watson & Pennebaker, 1989) to those with numerous, chronic, severely disabling symptoms 
(e.g., Jasper, Hiller, Rist, Bailer, & Witthöft, 2012).  
The economic burden is considerable. In the USA, the annual medical cost of MUS was 
previously estimated at $256 billion (Barsky, Orav, & Bates, 2005), while in the UK they are 
said to account for approximately 10% of the National Health Service Budget (Bermingham, 
Cohen, Hagua, & Parsonage, 2010). Up to 42 million work days are lost to MUS in the UK 
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each year (Bermingham et al., 2010), with the associated loss of productivity being estimated 
at $19,000 (US) per patient over 10 years ago (Hiller, Fichter, & Rief, 2003).  
The disease model clearly struggles to accommodate MUS. It is not clear what these 
conditions should be called (e.g., Creed et al., 2010) or how they should be classified (e.g., 
Kroenke, Sharpe, & Sykes, 2007).Various terms have been used apart from MUS, including 
“psychosomatic symptoms”, “functional symptoms”, “subjective health complaints”, 
“somatization”, “somatic symptom distress”, and “bodily distress”. However, there is little 
agreement on which is most appropriate (Creed et al., 2010; Kroenke, Sharpe, & Sykes, 2007) 
or on the level of description and analysis needed (i.e. as symptoms, syndrome, disorder, or 
disease). Within general medicine, particular clusters of MUS are often termed functional 
somatic syndromes, a category that includes irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue 
syndrome, fibromyalgia and numerous other specialty-specific conditions (Brown, 2007). In 
psychiatry, particular constellations of MUS are classified as somatoform disorders in the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 1992), a practice that was mirrored in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) until its most recent revision 
when the term “somatic symptom disorder” was coined (DSM-5; APA, 2013).  For the 
somatoform disorders, the emphasis is on symptoms, with diagnoses like somatization 
disorder (which pertains to individuals with multiple MUS) implying that sufferers have a 
general tendency to experience MUS that encompasses all bodily systems. This is also true of 
other systems for classifying patients with multiple MUS (e.g., Fink & Schröder, 2010; 
Kroenke et al., 1997; Rief & Hiller, 1999), developed in response to concerns about the 
sensitivity and specificity of the ICD-10 and DSM-IV criteria. 
There has been much debate about the overlap between (and within) the functional somatic 
syndromes and somatoform disorders (e.g., Henningsen, Zipfel & Herzog, 2007; Wessely, 
Nimnuan & Sharpe, 1999; Wessely & White, 2004; Witthöft, Fischer, Jasper, Rist, & Nater, 
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2016), and about the nosological categorisation of the functional syndromes and somatoform 
disorders as either diseases or (mental) disorders (Geniats, 2015; Jana, Praharaj, & 
Mazumdar, 2012). In addition, the blurred distinction between MUS and non-MUS has 
contributed to the recent removal of the somatoform disorders from DSM 5 (APA, 2013) and 
their replacement with a new Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders category. The 
centerpiece of this new category, somatic symptom disorder, incorporates all patients with 
chronic, distressing and/or disabling somatic symptoms who are also exhibiting positive 
psychological features (e.g., symptom preoccupation, excessive health worry, maladaptive 
illness behaviour), irrespective of whether organic disease has been found. As such, somatic 
symptom disorder excludes less severe cases of MUS/somatoform disorders compared to 
DSM-IV (Claassen-van Dessel, van der Wouden, Dekker & van der Horst, 2016), whist 
encompassing patients with functional somatic syndromes or documented organic disease 
where the associated psychological features are also present.  
By emphasizing the positive psychological features in response to bodily symptoms, 
somatic symptom disorder resolves some of the issues regarding the classification of physical 
symptoms but not others, leading some to propose a return to qualifying diagnoses by whether 
the somatic symptoms in question can be explained by a biomedical condition (see Rief & 
Martin, 2014, for a discussion). This illustrates a tension that is likely to remain until the 
disease model is complemented by a framework that explicitly addresses how consciously 
perceived symptoms (medically unexplained and otherwise) come about, and when and how 
they relate (or not) to bodily dysfunction.  
1.2. Somatosensory Amplification and Misattribution 
Probably the most influential account of MUS has been the somatosensory amplification 
model (Barsky & Wyshak, 1990). The amplification model assumes that MUS result from 
stress-related physiological arousal in threat-sensitive persons, whose illness concerns lead 
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them to misattribute normal sensations to disease causes (e.g., Barsky & Wyshak, 1990; Kolk, 
Hanewald, Schagen, & van Wijk, 2003). Physiological arousal also prompts the individual to 
focus attention on their body (attentional bias or ‘interoceptive hypervigilance’), lowering the 
threshold for perceiving somatic sensations while priming disease attributions (Barsky & 
Wyshak, 1990). Misinterpreting the sensations as threatening then causes a further increase in 
arousal, creating a vicious cycle. The core principles of physiological arousal, hypervigilance 
and misattribution arguably constitute the modal model of MUS, which is shared by a family 
of clinical models explaining MUS, hypochondriasis, hyperventilation syndrome and panic 
disorder. These principles are displayed in Figure 1.  
--------------------Figure 1 about here-------------------- 
Variations and elaborations on these themes abound. For example, there is some 
disagreement among the models as to the necessity of altered physiological arousal: in some 
models it is assumed that arousal is elevated compared to the normal state of the body, while 
in other models it is assumed that arousal can be within the normal range but perception is 
increased because of  hypervigilance to it. Exemplars of this family of models are described in 
Table 1.  
------------------------Table 1 about here--------------------- 
The assumptions shared by these models are central to cognitive-behavioral treatments for 
these complaints, because it is generally thought that there is good evidence for the modal 
model. We will briefly discuss this evidence.  
       1.2.1. Peripheral arousal and stress-related physiology. The popularity of the 
amplification model relies in part on the observation that physical symptom reports are 
commonly comorbid with symptoms of anxiety and depression (Wessely et al., 1999; 
Kroenke, 2003) and consistently associated (r = .40-.50) with higher trait negative affectivity 
(NA; i.e., a pervasive tendency to experience negative affect; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989) 
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and elevated stress levels (Tak & Rosmalen, 2010). Increased symptom reports in primary 
care have often been interpreted as resulting from elevated autonomic arousal (Kolk et al., 
2003; Kirmayer, Groleau, Looper & Dao, 2004). It is noteworthy, however, that the most 
extensive laboratory and ambulatory studies have not found significant differences between 
MUS reporters and healthy controls across a range of peripheral physiological stress or 
arousal indicators (e.g., heart rate, cardiac autonomic activity, respiration, salivary cortisol; 
Houtveen, Hamaker, & Van Doornen, 2010; Houtveen & Van Doornen, 2007).  
 In functional somatic syndromes, where the clinical picture is generally more severe, there 
is ongoing debate about the importance of physiological abnormalities, with a wide range of 
possible causes for symptoms being cited, including stress- and disease-related autonomic, 
endocrine and immune responses. It is important to note in this context that a simple causal 
model may be too simplistic, and that a distinction should be made between predisposing, 
precipitating and perpetuating factors. A specific physiological dysfunction eliciting 
symptoms in an initial stage (e.g. inflammation, infection) may be followed by processes that 
serve to maintain symptoms, such as stress-related physiology related to, for example, 
ongoing concerns. In the latter case, however, reliable associations should still be found 
between symptoms and physiological parameters if symptoms reflect physiological 
dysfunction.  
Meta-analytic and systematic review studies typically reveal a mixed picture. If 
relationships with physiological abnormalities are found at all, the associations are 
inconsistent, generally small, and the direction of causality between functional somatic 
syndromes and the dysfunction remains unclear, mostly leading to the conclusion that there is 
little convincing evidence for the causal role of a particular physiological dysfunction. This 
picture applies to autonomic function as indicated by heart rate variability: a meta-analysis by 
Tak et al. (2009) found no significant difference between patients with functional somatic 
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disorders and healthy controls after controlling for publication bias. Another review found no 
differences between patients with functional somatic syndromes and healthy controls in half 
of the studies, and some evidence of reduced cardiac vagal activity in another half, depending 
also on the type of functional syndrome (Tak et al.,  2010). A systematic review of Van 
Cauwenbergh et al. (2014) suggested a reduced cardiac response to a head-up tilt test in 
chronic fatigue patients in 7 of 8 studies. Taking the cortisol response to indicate 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis functioning, Tak et al. (2011) only found evidence 
for lower cortisol levels in chronic fatigue patients and in females with fibromyalgia, but not 
in irritable bowel syndrome. A review by Powell, Liossi, Moss-Morris & Schlotz (2013) 
could not establish hypocortisolism in chronic fatigue patients, but found evidence for an 
attenuation of the diurnal variability of the cortisol response. A similar picture arises from 
review studies on the role of inflammatory, infectious, or autoimmune dysfunction in 
functional somatic syndromes: few differences are found, and if so, they mostly pertain to 
different parameters (see Borchers & Gershwin, 2015; Üçeyler, Häuser & Sommer, 2011; 
Blundell et al., 2015; Ishihara et al., 2013; Schwille‐Kiuntke, Mazurak & Enck, 2015). 
Importantly, whenever a dysfunction is observed, few studies test whether the abnormalities 
actually cause or mediate the symptoms in question.  
1.2.2. Interoceptive hypervigilance, thresholds and awareness. Some versions of the 
amplification model give relatively more weight to hypervigilance and lowered perceptual 
thresholds for normal physiological arousal. Self-report studies indeed show that individuals 
with MUS report a tendency to scan the body for signs of illness (e.g., Gendolla, Abele, 
Andrei, Spurk, & Richter, 2005; Rief, Hiller, & Margraf, 1998). However, objective measures 
of attention to health-related stimuli have yielded less consistent findings. For symbolic 
material (e.g., illness words), some studies have found increased interference on the emotional 
Stroop task in patients with MUS (e.g., Afzal, Potokar, Probert, & Munafó, 2006; Lim & 
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Kim, 2005; Witthöft, Gerlach, & Bailer, 2006). These effects may be attributable to increased 
avoidance of health-threat rather than engagement with it (de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994), 
however, or stimulus negativity more generally (Posserud, Svedlund, Wallin, & Simrèn, 
2009). Studies using the dot-probe and exogenous cueing paradigms have not found evidence 
of attentional bias in MUS patients (Chapman & Martin, 2011; Hou, Moss-Morris, Bradley, 
Peveler, & Mogg, 2008; Martin & Alexeeva, 2010; Martin & Chapman, 2010; Van der Veek 
et al., 2014; Witthöft et al., 2006).  
Studies comparing fibromyalgia patients and healthy controls found no difference in their 
ability to detect innocuous tactile stimuli (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014; Van Damme et al., 
2014), and/or observed that only NA predicted daily symptom reports (Mussgay, 
Klinkenberg, and Rüddel, 1999; Schaefer, Egloff, and Witthöft, 2012). Other studies 
investigating attentional processing of bodily sensations themselves provide some evidence 
for a relationship between attention to the body and symptom reporting, although also 
implicate avoidance of bodily sensations (Brown, Poliakoff & Kirkman, 2007; Brown, 
Danquah, Miles, Holmes & Poliakoff, 2010).  Interestingly, Katzer, Oberfeld, Hiller, Gerlach, 
and Witthöft (2012) found that lower tactile perceptual thresholds were associated with fewer 
symptoms in patients with somatoform disorders on the Somatic Signal Detection Task 
(SSDT). Other studies found that both somatoform disorders (Katzer et al., 2012) and 
symptom reporting more generally (Brown et al., 2010, 2012; Katzer, Hiller, Oberfeld, & 
Witthöft, 2011) were associated with a tendency to report sensory experiences on the SSDT 
regardless of whether stimuli were actually presented (i.e. ‘false alarms’), seemingly 
contradicting the prediction of improved accuracy. Similarly, Van den Bergh and colleagues 
found significantly lower correspondence between induced respiratory changes and self-
reported breathlessness in a CO2 inhalation paradigm for non-clinical MUS reporters 
(Bogaerts et al., 2008) and MUS patients (Bogaerts et al., 2010b).  
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In sum, individuals with MUS consistently report a tendency to scan their bodies for signs 
of illness, but studies measuring actual attentional deployment towards body- or illness-
related stimuli fail to provide convincing evidence for an attentional bias towards these 
stimuli. Although the available evidence remains too limited for a firm conclusion, most 
evidence points to a lower correspondence between physiological changes and symptom 
reports in these individuals.   
1.2.3. Misattribution and interpretation bias. The modal model assumes that patients 
with MUS and related conditions show: (i) a tendency to (mis)interpret benign bodily 
sensations in a negative manner, that is, as overly intense, noxious, and potentially life-
threatening (Nakao & Barsky, 2007); and (ii) a tendency to attribute somatic sensations to 
somatic disease, rather than psychological or neutral/external causes (“somatic attribution 
bias”). Evidence in line with the (mis)interpretation assumption has been documented for 
most MUS-related conditions, such as chronic pain, somatoform disorders, fatigue, health 
anxiety and hypochondriasis (Goedendorp, van der Werf, Bleijenberg, Tummers, & Knoop, 
2013; Marcus, Gurley, Marchi, & Bauer, 2007; Rief et al., 1998; Rief & Broadbent 2007; Rief 
& Martin, 2014). These beliefs correlate with various ratings indicating the aversive quality of 
induced or existent bodily sensations, such as (pain) threshold and unpleasantness. Such 
beliefs are also reflected in behavioral evidence of a correlation between MUS, health 
anxiety, hypochondriasis and the automatic negative evaluation of both illness-related 
pictures (Jasper & Witthöft, 2013), illness words (Schreiber, Neng, Heimlich, Witthöft, & 
Weck, 2014), and aversive tactile stimuli (Witthöft, Basfeld, Steinhoff, & Gerlach, 2012), 
although this effect was not found in patients with non-cardiac chest pain (Schroeder, 
Gerlach, & Martin, 2014). It is not clear whether such findings point to a cause or 
consequence of MUS. One recent longitudinal population-based study found that catastrophic 
misinterpretations of bodily sensations at baseline were a significant predictor of 
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hypochondriacal concerns and fear of bodily sensations 18 months later, but not of physical 
symptom reports as assessed by a symptom checklist (Woud, Zhang, Becker, Zlomuzic, & 
Margraf, 2016). Apparently, in this study catastrophic misinterpretations contributed to later 
cognitive and emotional responses to MUS, but not to the occurrence of MUS themselves. 
Obviously, replications are needed to confirm this conclusion.     
Studies focusing on the attribution style of patients with MUS suggested a dominance of 
somatic symptom attributions (e.g., Craig, Boardman, Mills, Daly-Jones, & Drake, 1993; 
Robbins & Kirmayer, 1991), but recent evidence indicates that they are more complex than 
this (Hiller et al., 2010) and that somatic attributions do not predict the course of MUS 
(Douzenis & Seretis, 2013), implying that they are unlikely to play a causal role in the 
development and maintenance of symptoms. 
 1.2.4. Conclusion. Although the amplification model is intuitively appealing and remains 
clinically popular, the available evidence does not provide convincing support for the notion 
that MUS result from dysregulated peripheral (stress) physiology, hypervigilance for bodily 
sensations, heightened interoceptive accuracy, or misinterpretations of bodily sensations. 
Particularly, the notable lack of evidence that peripheral physiological abnormalities play a 
specific and causal role in functional somatic syndromes has contributed to growing interest 
among researchers in the concept of central sensitization as a potential common ground for 
functional somatic syndromes (see further; Kim & Chang, 2012; Nijs et al., 2012; Bourke, 
Langford & White, 2015). More generally, theorizing seems to have evolved towards 
identifying MUS as perceptual (or interoceptive) conditions (e.g., Brown, 2004; Edwards, 
Adams, Brown, Pareés, & Friston, 2012).  
1.3. How different are ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ symptoms?  
If standard medical practice regards MUS and functional somatic syndromes as unusual 
phenomena that should be exported to the psychological/psychiatric domain, it is generally 
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assumed that the disease model fares better as an account of the symptoms when dysfunction 
is actually present. Indeed, the correspondence between symptoms and objective 
physiological parameters is generally high for acute and localized dysfunction or pain (Price, 
Riley & Wade, 2001). This correspondence is both moderate and highly variable in many 
multi-symptomatic and chronic diseases, however. For example, there is a poor 
correspondence between somatic symptoms and objective disease severity in about 50% of 
asthma patients depending on the measure (Janssens, Verleden, De Peuter, Van Diest, & Van 
den Bergh, 2009). In chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), large scale studies on 
several thousands of patients showed large between-person variability in the relationship 
between objective airflow limitation (FEV1) and self-reported breathlessness, with a modest 
correlation overall (r = .36, Agusti et al., 2010; r = .28, Müllerová, Lu, Li & Tabberer, 2014).  
Within cardiology, the observed correlation between self-reported symptoms and objective 
parameters of heart disease (24-hour ambulatory monitoring, trans-telephonic ECGs, data 
from implanted pacemakers or defibrillators) ranges from near zero (Barsky, 2001) to 0.17 
(Sears et al., 2005). Similarly, the likelihood of reported arrhythmia symptoms coinciding 
with an actual arrhythmia ranges from 17% to 61.1%. Reports of atrial fibrillation have been 
found in the absence of tachyarrhythmias in 25% to 45% of cases (Atarashi, Ogawa, & Inoue, 
2008; Strickberger, Ip, Saksena, Curry, Bahnson, & Ziegler, 2005). Furthermore, regardless 
of their effect on objective physiological functioning, trait negative affect, negative emotions, 
and/or depression have often been found to predict symptom reports better than objective 
measures of cardiac or respiratory disease (e.g., Janssens et al., 2009; Sears et al., 2005; Van 
Oudenhove et al., 2008). Data have also shown that a transient increase in stress levels can 
alter the perception of symptoms in patients with gastro-esophageal reflux disease, resulting 
in increased symptom reports (Fass et al., 2008; Wright, Ebrecht, Mitchell, Anggiansah, & 
Weinman, 2005). 
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Subjective symptom reports correlating poorly with physiological changes have also been 
found in diabetes, for which accurate detection of health status is of crucial importance. 
Frankum and Ogden (2005), for example, found that 43.3% of patients underestimated their 
blood glucose and 17.3% overestimated it. Similarly, Ryan, Dulay, Suprasongsin, and Becker 
(2002) found that estimation of blood glucose was only 28% accurate for hypoglycemia and 
38% for euglycemia in a sample of adolescents and young adults. Although there have been 
studies showing greater correlations (.70) between estimated and actual blood glucose 
(Schandry, Leopold, & Vogt, 1996), symptom perception in this context is generally 
considered inaccurate. Evidence also shows that physicians’ assessment of symptoms is more 
highly correlated with objective organic parameters (0.52-0.92) than those of patients (.34-
.70; Turner et al., 2010).  
In sum, research with medical populations suggests that correlations between symptom 
reports and objective disease indicators vary substantially, are often low to moderate, and that 
emotional factors play a particularly significant role in symptom reporting. In other words, a 
large proportion of the symptoms presented in the context of a well-defined disease could 
technically be considered “MUS”. This is mostly overlooked, however, as few studies 
actually measure the within-person correspondence between physiological dysfunction and 
symptom reports.  
1.4. Interim summary 
        The divide of western medical systems into either ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ health 
disciplines is arguably responsible for most controversies regarding MUS, with physical and 
mental health specialists favoring distinct terms, diagnostic criteria and illness narratives for 
an overlapping set of complaints. Numerous commentators have criticized the 
oversimplifying mind-body dualism that is inherent to this approach (Rief & Martin, 2014). In 
addition, a brief excursion into “medically explained diseases” casts doubt on the logic of a 
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clear differentiation between symptoms that do and do not have a physiological explanation. 
Evidently, there is some continuity in the mechanisms underlying all symptom reporting, 
whether an ‘organic’ condition is present or not. Since the seminal monograph of Pennebaker 
on the psychology of physical symptoms (Pennebaker, 1982), and extensive elaborations in 
later models (see Cioffi, 1991; Leventhal & Leventhal, 1993; Leventhal, Leventhal, & 
Contrada, 1998), the role of psychological factors in symptom reporting and health care use 
has been clearly documented. These models typically describe how factors such as beliefs, 
attributions, emotional states and attention modulate the relationship between physiological 
dysfunction and symptom reports, but rarely question the basic assumption of the disease 
model. Moreover, they provide little insight into how consciously perceived symptoms come 
about, and when or how they relate (or not) to bodily dysfunction. There is a clear need for a 
symptom perception model that complements the disease model by explaining both 
"explained" and "unexplained" symptoms, without having to rely on the concept of peripheral 
physiological change in all cases. We attempt to provide such a framework below.  
 
2. A New Perspective 
2.1. Aims and Central Tenets 
In this section we describe a comprehensive model of symptom perception that integrates 
research and theory on MUS and functional disorders with that on symptom and body 
perception more generally. Our goal is to describe the mechanisms underlying the conscious 
experience of somatic symptoms, and thereby the conditions that govern how and when those 
symptoms correspond with physiological dysfunction. We argue that MUS reflect a 
perceptual system that is continually generating, testing and refining hypotheses about the 
causes of sensory inputs, and which is vulnerable to mistaken inferences and false percepts 
under certain conditions. We suggest that MUS can be regarded as somatovisceral illusions, 
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comparable to visual illusions in casting light on fundamental aspects of perception (also 
Norman, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2014). We claim that this process of automatic and 
unconscious hypothesis testing applies as much to “veridical” symptom perception (where 
symptoms correspond closely with physiological dysfunction), as to biased symptom 
perception (where symptom reports seem only partly consistent with physiological data), and 
MUS (where no relationship with physiological data is found at all). The central tenets of our 
account can be summarised as follows:  
1. Somatic symptoms are conscious percepts that result from a constructive process, in 
which the brain interprets information from the body in the light of predictions (broadly 
speaking, expectations) given past experience; this process is moderated by the relative 
precision afforded to the predictions and the prediction errors;  
2. The relationship between parameters of bodily dysfunction and self-reported symptoms 
is highly variable both between and within individuals over time, depending on 
interactions between characteristics of the physiological input, the (historical) person and 
the context; key factors in this respect are those governing the individual’s interoceptive 
sensitivity/acuity and the implicit categorization criteria used to decide whether a 
sensation is a symptom;  
3. The relationship between parameters of bodily dysfunction and self-reported symptoms 
varies dimensionally. Although MUS are at one end of this continuum, they are 
functionally comparable both to biased symptom reports of identifiable physiological 
dysfunction and symptoms experienced in the context of well-described diseases;   
4. The very process of enquiring about the presence of somatic percepts influences how we 
experience our body and thereby the symptoms we report. 
Our approach is fundamentally different from traditional symptom perception accounts, 
which assume that “…the perception of physical symptoms is generally preceded by 
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peripheral, physiological changes” (Kolk et al., 2003, p. 2344; see Table 1). It builds on 
previous accounts of MUS (the Integrative Cognitive Model, ICM; Brown, 2004, 2006, 2013; 
Brown & Reuber, 2016) and functional neurological and motor symptoms (“conversion 
symptoms”; Edwards et al., 2012), which assume that peripheral physiological input is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for symptoms to be experienced. By this view, top-down processes 
not only influence how, but also whether we experience symptoms. As in the ICM, we regard 
MUS as distortions in awareness brought about by the over-activation of symptom 
representations in memory, with various top-down factors serving to maintain this; we move 
beyond the ICM by integrating our approach more explicitly with existing work on body 
perception and interoception, and with accounts of the neurobiological substrates of these 
processes. We also place more emphasis on affective processing, and address certain 
limitations of the ICM in relation to the role of attention in symptom development and 
maintenance. Our account follows Edwards et al. (2012) in adopting a predictive coding 
perspective to help elucidate the mechanisms of MUS. However, Edwards et al. (2012) 
focuses specifically on functional motor and sensory symptoms (e.g., anaesthesia, movement 
disorders, sensory loss), and excludes functional symptoms involving autonomic dysfunction 
and/or arousal, functional syndromes and other somatization problems (ibid; p. 3496). The 
latter are the main focus of our paper, in the context of symptom perception more generally. 
We limit ourselves to processes that help explain how the conscious experience of bodily 
symptoms comes about, although we acknowledge that symptom perception occurs in an 
interpersonal and social context that evidently shapes how symptoms are labelled and 
reported. For the sake of brevity, these social processes are only indirectly taken into account 
in our model.  
We start by describing the basic processes underlying perception of the internal state of the 
body.   
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2.2. Interoception As Inference 
Although a continuous, fluctuating array of stimuli impinges on receptors inside our body, 
most interoceptive information is used by local and subcortical regulation systems and is not 
amenable to conscious perception. From the limited amount of sensory information that 
afferent systems can process, the brain could theoretically create an infinite number of 
patterns of experiences. The task of the brain is to group input into those patterns that are 
most useful, reducing computational load by ignoring inputs that are unlikely to have adaptive 
value. Since Helmholtz (1860), numerous theorists (e.g., Gregory, 1980; Friston, 2005; 
Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007; Clark, 2013) have argued that the brain achieves this 
through an inferential process, involving the creation of probabilistic models about the causes 
of current inputs to the system, based on prior knowledge. These assumptions have recently 
been elaborated for interoceptive and affective information processing and their interaction 
with external perception (Barrett & Bar, 2009; Edwards et al., 2012; Seth, 2013; Barrett & 
Simmons, 2015). Chronic pain has recently been conceptualized using a predictive coding 
perspective, as has the modulation of pain perception by placebo and nocebo expectations 
(see Büchel et al., 2014; Hechler, Endres, & Thorwart, 2016; Wiech, 2016). Our account 
builds on these approaches. 
2.2.1. Prediction, prediction error and precision. In predictive coding models, learned 
knowledge about the world is conceptualized as a set of neural representations or ‘priors’, 
which capture the statistical regularities of brain activity. These are represented as probability 
distributions that describe an expected range of values for a given input and their associated 
likelihood (Figure 2). Different prior distributions match sensory inputs (“observation” in 
Figure 2) to varying degrees, resulting in prediction errors (i.e., the portion of input not 
predicted by the prior, or the difference in mean between prior and “observed” distributions).  
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Every combination of prior and observed distributions constitutes a model of the causes of the 
actual stimulation, each with a different range of probabilities (posterior distribution). 
------------------------ Insert Figure 2 about here ------------------------- 
  These generative models initially capture the gist of the stimulus array (Kveraga et al., 
2007), and prediction errors are then used to further refine them. A fundamental “motivation” 
of the system is to minimize prediction error (Friston, 2005). This process can be 
accomplished by updating the prior to account for unpredicted stimulation (perceptual 
inference; broadly speaking: changing “expectations”), by generating information that fits the 
prior through action (active inference), or by changing how input is sampled by the brain 
(Barrett & Simmons, 2015). The system that accomplishes this is hierarchically organized, 
such that lower levels of the hierarchy represent the basic properties of the sensory input, with 
complexity, abstraction and spatio-temporal scale increasing as one proceeds through the 
hierarchy. There is a continuous, bi-directional flow of information through this hierarchy, 
such that each level receives predictions from, and feeds back prediction errors to, the levels 
above. In a continuous interplay of these processes, bottom-up information (prediction errors) 
is dependent on top-down influences (predictions), which themselves are influenced by 
previous prediction errors depending on their precision. It also means that dysfunctional 
predictions will have consequences for predictions errors, and vice versa (see below).   
Across a number of experiences, predictions and prediction errors may acquire associated 
“confidence”, represented by the variance around the mean of the distribution (i.e., they have 
different precisions). A precise prior corresponds to a strong prediction, allowing for 
perceptual decisions with a high level of confidence. We use the term confidence in a 
statistical sense only, since these perceptual decisions rarely reach the level of awareness for 
them to manifest as meta-cognitive certainty; instead, the subject simply perceives what the 
system has concluded is (or is not) there.  
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Consider the case of a newly developed condition such as asthma, when a patient starts to 
encounter interoceptive sensations that may or may not represent an asthma symptom. In 
Figure 2a, relatively few prior observations are available, meaning that the perceptual system 
is less certain whether a sensation (e.g., feeling of tightness in the chest) is a relevant indicator 
of the person’s health status. This is represented in Figure 2a as a relatively broad, flat prior 
distribution, that is, one with relatively low precision with a central tendency that is located at 
a low probability (central tendency on the left hand side of the x axis), indicating that the 
diagnostic value of this sensation for asthma is low. Comparatively precise new observations 
(grey line) have a considerable impact on such a vague prior and shift the initial hypothesis to 
be closer to the new evidence (the posterior; black line).  As more observations are made 
(e.g., over the course of a year), the system learns that the sensation is indeed a valid indicator 
of asthma, resulting in a narrower, denser (i.e., more precise) prior distribution that shifted to 
the right as the estimated probability of the sensation being an asthma symptom increased 
(dashed line in Figure 2b). The larger amount of past evidence by this point means that the 
same amount of new information (i.e., new encounters with the sensation; grey line in 2b) has 
less of an impact on the inference process than before, meaning that the posterior distribution 
(black line in 2b) remains close to the prior. Figure 2c illustrates a case where, in contrast to 
the first two examples, the probability of a sensation indicating asthma on the basis of prior 
experiences is high, while the somatic sensation (observation) is less precise. Here there is 
even less of an impact of the new observation, resulting in minimal change from the prior 
distribution and stronger editing of the incoming information. The result is an experience 
(posterior) that reflects the prior rather than the observation, with pre-existing expectations 
being maintained. 
In precise distributions there is a greater likelihood that the expected/actual value falls 
close to the mean, resulting in a larger influence on the generative model. Typically, the 
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model with the lowest overall prediction error is that with the optimal balance between 
precision and accuracy (i.e., the smallest difference between the means of the predicted and 
prediction error distributions). An important aspect of the perceptual process is how the 
system determines whether the prediction is an adequate account of the input. In order to do 
this, it must be able to estimate the likelihood of any residual prediction error being random 
noise, or whether it could be reduced further by updating the prediction. The system does so 
by developing context-dependent expectations about the likely precision of its inputs, and it 
compensates for these by adjusting the weight placed on them in the perceptual process 
(Hohwy, 2012). Visual prediction errors are higher in the dark, for example, and relatively 
more likely to be a product of noise than signal than when it is light. In contrast, the system 
learns that errors arising in the light are likely to be meaningful (i.e., an unexpected stimulus), 
and should have more of an influence on perception.  
The process of attributing weights to the prediction errors to optimize perception (precision 
optimization) is thought to be an important factor determining the dominant generative model 
and therefore conscious percepts (Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012). Typically, priors 
have less influence and are more subject to revision when processing involves units expecting 
precise information from the sensorium (e.g., in the light). Conversely, priors have more of an 
influence on perception, and are more resistant to updating, when noisy, imprecise sensory 
input is expected (e.g., in the dark). One consequence of this is that mistakes can be made 
when unexpected-but-meaningful signals arise when inputs are predicted to be imprecise, 
biasing perception towards a precise but inaccurate prior. Thus, we may mistake Joe for Fred 
in the dark if there is a strong expectation that Fred will arrive first. In the account below we 
develop the idea that MUS involve a similar perceptual error. 
2.2.2. Neurobiological considerations. Vagus nerve afferents are a major source of 
interoceptive information, relaying sensory information from nearly every visceral and 
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somatic system to the brain through the nucleus tractus solitarius (NTS) and ascending 
projections to brainstem, limbic and cortical structures (Berthoud & Neuhuber, 2000). Several 
brain structures and circuits are critical in constructing and representing a conscious state of 
the body (e.g., Craig, 2002, 2009) forming an interoceptive nervous system (Harshaw, 2015). 
For example, the anterior insular cortex is generally considered to play a central role in 
constructing a multimodal representation of the internal state of the body, integrating 
hormonal, immunological, metabolic, thermal, autonomic, visceromotor, proprioceptive, 
exteroceptive, motivational and cognitive sources of information (Craig, 2009; Critchley & 
Harrison, 2013). The anterior insular cortex is also considered to play a critical role as a 
source of visceromotor predictions and in matching prediction errors with predictions (Seth, 
2013; Seth, Suzuki & Chritchley, 2011). Through close connections with the anterior 
cingulate cortex, these multi-modal representations also involve affective-motivational 
components and associated approach-avoidance tendencies, consistent with the close 
connection between interoceptive inference about bodily states and feelings and emotions 
(Seth, 2013; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012). Other structures involved in processing the 
affective value of interoceptive stimuli are the orbitofrontal (Barrett & Bar, 2009) and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which, together with parts of the cingulate cortex, are thought 
to constitute a stimulus valuation network (Harshaw, 2015) that engages behavioral control 
systems when local physiological regulation fails (e.g., gasping for air and opening the 
window when breathless).  
A predictive coding perspective assumes that precision is represented by the action of 
specific cells that tune the synaptic gain (i.e., post-synaptic responsiveness) of cells encoding 
predictions and prediction errors (Friston, 2008; Barrett & Simmons, 2015). As there is a 
constant interplay between priors and prediction errors at multiple hierarchical levels, a 
predictive coding model surpasses simple and unidirectional conceptions of “top-down” and 
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“bottom-up” processes, as well as the notion that specific functions are localized to particular 
brain regions. Consistent with this, recent neurobiological models have emphasized 
continuous interactions between counter-flowing streams of information at multiple 
hierarchical levels. Barrett and Simmons’ (2015) Embodied Predictive Interoceptive Coding 
model describes an integrated neural network that serves both homeostatic and allostatic 
control functions as well as interoception. It emphasizes more widespread corticocortical 
connectivity across hierarchically organized lamina (cortical columns) forming granular, 
agranular and (intermediate) dysgranular cortices. These cortices consist of anatomically 
different cells acting as prediction, prediction error and precision neurons. Agranular 
visceromotor cortices comprising mid-cingulate, anterior cingulate cortex, posterior 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and parts of the anterior insula generate autonomic, hormonal 
and immunological predictions to adjust the body to anticipated needs. This information is 
also sent to granular cortices comprising the mid-to-posterior insula, where prediction errors 
are calculated and sent back to agranular visceromotor regions; here, outputs to the body are 
modulated and new interoceptive predictions arise. Visceromotor cortices can also modulate 
the gain of corticothamalic and thalamocortical connections (i.e., attention to interoceptive 
sensations). 
 Importantly, agranular visceromotor regions are considered to be relatively insensitive to 
prediction error signals due to precision-weighting factors and aspects of the cytoarchitecture. 
For this reason, interoceptive prediction errors are typically small, meaning that interoceptive 
perception (the posterior model) is largely dominated by prior expectations. As Barrett and 
Simmons (2015, p. 424) put it: “interoceptive perception is largely a construction of beliefs 
that are kept in check by the actual state of the body (rather than vice versa)”. Another 
important feature is that agranular visceromotor cortices are a central hub sending efferent 
copies of predictions to multiple sensory systems across the brain, and thus subserve “a 
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multisensory representation of the world from the perspective of someone with a body” (ibid, 
p. 425). This architecture contributes to embodiment of perception, cognition and emotion, 
and to bi-directional penetrance (i.e., cross-fertilisation) of interoceptive and exteroceptive 
information (Harshaw, 2015, for examples). These neurobiological findings place important 
constraints on theories of symptom perception, which is evidently highly sensitive to prior 
expectations and contextual cues. 
2.2.3. Interoception, expectations and the sense of self. Conceptualising interoception as 
inference blurs the distinction between perceptions and beliefs or expectations. Consistent 
with this, neurobiological findings show that largely the same brain areas are activated 
regardless of whether symptoms are produced using expectancy manipulations or elicited by 
peripheral stimulation. For example, an fMRI study of patients with disabling self-reported 
electrosensitivity exposed to sham mobile phone radiation found activation in the same brain 
regions (anterior cingulate cortex; left and right anterior insular cortex) as that produced by 
actual nociceptive stimulation (heat pain; Landgrebe et al., 2008). Similarly, Derbyshire, 
Whalley, Stenger, and Oakley (2004) found that hypnotic suggestions for pain activated the 
same brain areas as a thermal pain stimulus, including anterior cingulate cortex, anterior 
insular cortex and somatosensory cortex (S2). In placebo analgesia to experimental pain, 
activations also emerge in similar brain areas to those involved in processing the sensory and 
emotional/affective components of pain (Enck, Benedetti, & Schedlowski, 2008). 
Interoceptive representations are thought to be central to the sense of self, the experience 
of body ownership and the feeling of being “present” in the world (Damasio, 2010; Seth, 
2013). When conflict is created between interoceptive and exteroceptive information, the 
process of minimizing prediction error can give rise to somatosensory disturbances in which 
the core classes of me/not me are confused. In the Rubber Hand Illusion, for example, a fake 
hand can be experienced as one’s own if it is stroked at the same time and rate as the genuine 
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(but concealed) body part (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Interestingly, people with poor 
interoceptive sensitivity tend to report a stronger illusion (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiminez & 
Costantini, 2011). A more prosaic example is the illusory sense of motion that is often 
experienced when sitting on a stationary train and observing a neighboring train depart. These 
and other examples illustrate how perceptual inference can misrepresent the true causes of 
events in the world, giving rise to unusual yet compelling somatosensory experiences. We 
suggest that similar processes are operating in MUS and other cases of symptom 
misperception. 
2.3. Interoceptive Inference and Symptom Perception  
Subjective feeling states and embodied selfhood rely on active inference about a 
multisensory array of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals (Clark, 2013; Seth, 2013; 
Barrett & Simmons, 2015). Accordingly, the feeling of being healthy may be considered an 
inference of the experiencing self, whereby somatic prediction errors (e.g., normal somatic 
variations) are accounted for by predictions regarding what constitutes a “normal body 
condition”. This applies even in the context of continuous and varying input from bodily 
receptors to the brain, as long as those inputs remain within the predicted range. Subjectively, 
this is likely to be experienced as the relative absence of interoceptive sensations and bodily 
awareness. By this view, interoceptive sensations only arise in the event of a sufficient 
increase in prediction error, with the threshold for the required increase (i.e., the error 
“tolerance”) varying across situations and individuals. A crucial reference point for these 
prediction errors are the innate values for homeostasis (i.e., ‘built-in’ priors or predictions 
about viable physiological functioning) that have emerged from biological evolution (Van de 
Cruys, 2014). When there is deviation from these homeostatic reference values, the resulting 
interoceptive error signals will often be minimized by automatic physiological regulation 
mechanisms. If these low-level mechanisms remain unsuccessful, or when prediction errors 
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are strong and persistent, the errors may give rise to interoceptive sensations (i.e., phenomenal 
percepts pertaining to the body, associated with varying degrees of conscious awareness) and 
recruit behavioral control systems to reduce prediction error and re-establish homeostasis.  
Aside from the statistical regularities of the inputs themselves and the homeostatic 
reference values, symptom perception depends on the priors that have been acquired over the 
course of the individual’s learning history concerning the potential causes of somatosensory 
inputs. At higher levels of representation, this includes abstract information about both 
normative (e.g., temporary dehydration; physical exercise) and non-normative causes (e.g., 
disease). The latter are broadly equivalent to the symptom schemata, symptom representations 
and illness representations described in other models (e.g., Leventhal, Diefenbach, & 
Leventhal, 1992; Pennebaker, 1982; Cioffi, 1991; Brown, 2004). Whether the input is 
experienced as a symptom or a sensation depends on the nature of the best-fitting model. We 
propose that symptoms are experienced when the generative model with the lowest overall 
prediction error represents an interoceptive event with an abnormal (typically disease) cause. 
In other words, symptoms arise when the brain interprets interoceptive inputs with reference 
to predictions about the likely cause of those inputs and infers that there is something wrong 
with the body (in which ‘wrongness’ can vary from rather vague [“not well”] to quite specific 
[“cancer”]).  
For each set of inputs there are numerous possible interpretations or predictions, with the 
phenomenology of the experience being jointly determined by the predictions and inputs with 
the closest match (see Fig. 2). An important implication of this is that there are many different 
ways of experiencing a set of inputs, which vary according to the parameters of the available 
predictions. Where the generative model is characterized by a highly accurate prediction, the 
associated experience will correspond closely with the sensory input (i.e., the correlation 
between subjective reports and objective physiology will be maximized). Crucially, however, 
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highly accurate predictions may not be part of the optimal model, depending on the precision 
weights associated with the predictions and the prediction errors (see below). An important 
implication of this is that distorted (as in symptom under- and over-reporting) or ‘false’ 
perceptions (as in MUS) can arise if the weight of the prediction makes it part of the optimal 
model, despite accuracy (i.e., the match between the prediction and the input) being low.  
Building on the work of Edwards et al. (2012), we assume that symptom reports that are 
decoupled from sensory input – and MUS in the extreme case – arise when, in the presence of 
predictive cues, excessive precision is afforded to priors predicting the presence of 
symptoms/disease, rendering those priors the optimal model regardless of whether they are a 
good match for sensory input. As a result, the individual’s experience is distorted in the 
direction of the priors. How much the experience is related to objective physiology will 
depend on the extent of the mismatch between the prior and the sensory input and their 
relative precision weights. In most disease states, highly precise error signals emerge from 
multiple sources in spatiotemporal proximity (e.g., cough, fatigue, running nose); these will 
typically combine with contextual cues (e.g., a partner having a cold) to promote precise 
priors that explain away the prediction errors, leaving the person with a clear illness 
experience (“I have a cold”) that closely corresponds with measurable evidence.     
Minor distortions may occur when there is some correspondence between the prior and the 
input (i.e., the distance between the means of their distributions is relatively small) but the 
precision of the prior pulls the mean of the posterior distribution towards it; in this case, the 
experience will be an exaggeration of the input or particular aspects of it (e.g., making it more 
painful than might be expected given the stimulus). In other cases, the mismatch between the 
prior and the input may be more substantial, generating a subjectively real but objectively 
illusory experience (e.g., MUS; also Edwards et al., 2012). Studies demonstrating the 
acquisition of symptoms through associative learning (e.g., Van den Bergh, Kempynck, Van 
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de Woestijne, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1995; Van den Bergh, Stegen, & Van de Woestijne, 1997; 
Van den Bergh, Winters, Devriese, & Van Diest, 2002) suggest this can occur when frequent 
pairing of a cue with a veridical (i.e., objectively triggered) somatic experience raises the 
predictive validity of the associated prior, giving it greater perceptual influence in subsequent 
encounters with the cue. If the precision of the prior becomes sufficiently high, the cue may 
come to trigger the experience in the absence of the input. These studies, which involved 
pairing a harmless odor with CO2-enriched air inhalation across repeated breathing trials, 
found that the conditioning effect was only observed if the odor was negative and only in high 
NA individuals and MUS patients, suggesting that the effect is dependent on there being a 
plausible relationship between the cue and symptom experience, and a tendency to perceive 
bodily threat. This is relevant for chronic disease, where different contextual cues may come 
to promote the underlying generative model as symptoms are experienced over time. As a 
result, symptom reports may gradually become decoupled from physiology and more 
dependent on contextual cues (De Peuter et al., 2005; Janssens et al., 2009). Recent research 
on pain-related placebo and nocebo effects suggests that these processes can arise in the 
absence of conscious perception (Jensen, Kirsch, Odmalm, Kaptchuk, & Ingvar, 2015). 
Verbal expectancy manipulations, such as those used during hypnotic suggestion and 
placebo/nocebo paradigms, are also effective ways of creating (or removing) symptom 
experiences, influencing both neurobiological and peripheral physiological systems at 
multiple hierarchical levels ranging from cortical to spinal (Atlas & Wager, 2014; Büchel, 
Geuter, Sprenger, & Eippert, 2014; Enck, Bingel, Schedlowski, & Rief, 2013; Jubb & 
Bensing, 2013).  
 In sum, symptom experiences may correspond to varying degrees with peripheral somatic 
input, depending on the interplay between prediction errors, priors and their relative 
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precisions. Various contextual and individual factors modulate this correspondence, the four 
main types of which are considered below.   
2.4. Factors Influencing Symptom Perception 
2.4.1. Varieties of afferent input. Interoceptive signals can vary along numerous 
dimensions, such as intensity, quality, location, extent and duration (e.g., compare toothache 
and fatigue). Although agranular visceromotor regions are considered relatively insensitive to 
prediction error signals (Barrett & Simmons, 2015, see above), we assume that more intense 
and localized signals (e.g., a racing heart) will generate more precise prediction errors that are 
likely to modify and update priors accordingly, resulting in an experienced stimulus. How that 
sensation is experienced depends on the priors that predict the likely consequences of the 
input. Thus, a benignly pounding heart might be experienced as a neutral sensation in the 
context of recent exercise, or as a potential heart attack in the presence of cues suggesting a 
possible disease cause. In both cases, perceptual detection may be good (i.e., associated with 
accurate heartbeat detection), but perceptual categorization is inaccurate in the latter.  
There is greater scope for highly precise but inaccurate priors to dominate the generative 
model for somatic stimuli with less precise prediction errors, such as those that are weaker, 
more systemic and widespread, characterized by poor on/off boundaries and/or when the 
boundaries with other sensation categories are blurred. Examples of such symptoms include 
fatigue, inflammation-induced “malaise” and somatic input from stress-related HPA-axis 
activation. Imprecise prediction errors may also result from various types of interoceptive 
dysfunction that influence the quality and resolution of the somatic signals that eventually 
determine conscious symptom perception (Harshaw, 2015; Schulz & Vögele, 2015). For 
example, there is experimental evidence that both cytokines (Eisenberger, Inagaki, Rameson, 
Mashal & Irwin, 2009; Harrison et al., 2009a,b) and stress/HPA-axis activation influence 
structural and/or functional characteristics of interoceptive brain areas (Stein, Simmons, 
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Feinstein & Paulus, 2007; Liston, McEwen, & Casey, 2009; Gianaros et al., 2007). Similarly, 
evidence suggests that early life adversity and chronic stress reduce the density and 
functionality of α2-adrenoceptors in the NTS, which may further compromise sensitive 
processing of afferent signals from the viscera (Schulz & Vögele, 2015). Genetic factors may 
also contribute to low signal-to-noise ratios in interoceptive sensitivity (Holliday et al., 2010; 
Gazouli et al., 2016). Such mechanisms may account for the link between inflammatory and 
stress-related variables, functional somatic syndromes and increased symptom reports.  
In conditions characterized by both imprecise priors and prediction errors, contextual and 
individual difference variables may have a particularly significant impact on symptom 
experiences, decoupling them from physiology. For example, it is possible to induce 
symptoms in nonclinical and clinical MUS patients simply by presenting them with 
unpleasant pictures, followed by cues (such as the questions on a symptom scale) promoting 
attention to particular models of their somatic state (Constantinou, Bogaerts, Van Diest, & 
Van den Bergh, 2013; Constantinou, Van den Houte, Bogaerts, Van Diest, & Van den Bergh, 
2015).  
Decoupled symptoms will reflect the beliefs that are represented by the priors in question, 
suggesting that differences in beliefs will largely account for the differences in clinical 
phenomenology. If a belief reflects a particularly precise prior about the presence of a certain 
experience, it might manifest as a single, debilitating unexplained symptom but low symptom 
reporting more generally. Where an individual has broader health concerns (i.e., low precision 
priors) but the prediction errors are also imprecise, a tendency to experience multiple 
symptoms may result, as in habitual symptom reporting and patients with the historic DSM-
IV diagnosis of somatization disorder. It is likely that with broader health concerns, individual 
sensitivities and contextual cues may give more weight to some priors than others, coloring 
the presentation accordingly. For example, critical incidents pertaining to bowel function may 
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result in greater precision being afforded to gastrointestinal symptoms, whereas prior 
exposure to viral infection may result in similar emphasis being placed on exhaustion and 
pain. This would explain how the same set of complaints can end up attracting different 
diagnoses (e.g., irritable bowel syndrome vs. chronic fatigue syndrome) depending on the 
medical specialty where they are encountered (Wesseley et al., 1999). 
2.4.2. Varieties of attention. Attentional modulation of visceromotor prediction errors, 
which influences the balance of precision weights between priors and prediction errors, is 
thought to be implemented by gain mechanisms in the anterior insula and anterior cingulate 
cortex (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and in corticothalamic connections influencing the 
thalamic reticular nucleus (Zikopoulos & Barbas, 2006; Barrett & Simmons, 2015). This gain 
mechanism is attracted to causal regularity in the world, giving a probabilistic advantage to 
generative models that maximize the signal-to-noise ratio (Hohwy, 2012). When a cue 
promoting attention is valid (i.e., predictive), it facilitates perception of the corresponding 
stimuli; when it is invalid, subsequent stimuli will be at a perceptual disadvantage (ibid). As 
precision weights vary according to individual and contextual factors, these factors will 
influence the accuracy of somatic perception.  
If there are no cues directing attention to the body, minor prediction errors may go 
unnoticed. In contrast, if priors (e.g., illness-related beliefs or worries) increase the gain on 
interoceptive error units (i.e., tilt the balance between precision weights of priors and 
prediction errors towards the latter, thereby increasing ‘body-focus’), relatively weak 
interoceptive stimulation will be represented as stronger and more precise, reflected in more 
intense or salient conscious percepts. This is a type of self-fulfilling prophecy: an expectation 
for a strong bottom-up signal increasing the strength of that signal. The increased prediction 
error will also motivate the system to update its priors in order to account for it. In this 
context, a model that attributes the inputs to physical illness might be the optimal way of 
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explaining away the interoceptive error, particularly in the presence of relevant cues (e.g., 
those suggesting a possible health threat). Eventually a self-perpetuating cycle may arise, with 
illness-related worrying raising the precision of associated priors to the point where a disease 
model pertains, whether interoceptive stimuli are present or not. In other words, a symptom 
may begin as the amplification of a weak somatic input but end up as a somatosensory false 
alarm in which noise is misrepresented as signal. This account unifies the somatosensory 
amplification and ICM within a common framework, while at the same time describing 
critical mechanisms contributing to the maintenance and chronicity of symptoms over time.   
Where somatic signals are expected to be imprecise (due to low intensity/ambiguous 
inputs, noisy receptor systems etc.) there will be relatively greater weighting of prior models 
concerning the body. In the absence of precise error feedback to revise those models, they are 
likely to become increasingly divorced from sensory input over time. This fits with the 
evidence reviewed above linking MUS with poor interoceptive accuracy, which is likely to 
result in an expectation of imprecise sensory inputs.  
Several contextual and individual factors may influence the gain and thereby symptom 
experiences. Scanning for signs of illness, for example, is a form of active inference, whereby 
the system selectively samples sensory inputs with a view to confirming its own predictions 
(cf. “confirmatory bias”). The precision of the signal being scanned for is relevant here, with 
the nature of the individual’s illness beliefs influencing where the gain is applied. If a 
relatively precise threat is predicted, for example, then the perception of signals that 
correspond to that threat will be optimized (making them more likely to become conscious). 
There will not be a broader increase in gain on other units, and no lowering of interoceptive 
thresholds more generally, unless the illness predictions are more non-specific. This has clear 
implications for the choice of stimuli used in studies of attentional bias, which need to be 
tailored to the particular beliefs of each participant.  
35 
 It is important to note that in the current model, attention is simply the process by which 
gain is applied to predictions and prediction error units, increasing or decreasing their relative 
weight in the perceptual process. Conscious contents, on the other hand, are determined by 
the generative model with the lowest overall prediction error. By this view, there is a close 
correspondence between what is “attended to” (i.e., receives gain) and what the individual is 
conscious of (as gain increases the likelihood of the model being optimal), but the two 
concepts are nevertheless separable (Hohwy, 2012).  
2.4.3. Gender. One of the most consistent findings in this area is that women report more, 
more intense and more frequent symptoms than men, a difference that remains after 
controlling for specific female gender symptoms (Barsky, Peekna & Borus, 2001). MUS, 
somatoform disorders and functional somatic syndromes are also consistently more prevalent 
in women than men across clinical and non-clinical settings (e.g., Aamland et al., 2014; 
Kroenke & Spitzer, 1998; Wessely et al., 1999; Cloninger et al., 1986). A wide variety of 
potentially related factors might account for this gender difference in symptom reporting, 
including biological differences in nociception, exposure to early adversity (Edwards, Holden, 
Felitti & Anda, 2003), and neuroendocrine stress responses (Bartley & Fillingim, 2016; 
Doom, Cicchetti, Rogosch & Dackis, 2013). Gender-related differences in symptom 
appraisal, socialization processes and gender roles, as well as gender biases in research and 
clinical practices, may also account for some of the effect (Barsky et al., 2001). However, two 
additional observations are important in this respect: First, in laboratory environments, 
women are consistently found to be less accurate than men at detecting physiological changes 
in, for example, heart rate, blood glucose, blood pressure, respiration, and gastrointestinal 
sensations (Pennebaker & Roberts, 1992; Roberts & Pennebaker, 1994), which may be due to 
gender-related structural and functional differences in the interoceptive network in the brain 
(Naliboff et al., 2003; Fairclough & Goodwin, 2007, Harshaw, 2015). Second, this laboratory 
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difference in interoceptive accuracy disappears in natural environments, which may be related 
to women being more sensitive to contextual cues when determining their internal state (see 
Pennebaker & Roberts, 1992; Roberts & Pennebaker, 1994; Pennebaker, 1995). An 
implication is that contextually driven priors are likely to have a greater influence on 
women’s interoception (and therefore symptom perception), while prediction errors resulting 
from somatic input are more likely to influence men than women. This perspective predicts 
that this will be more the case in conditions where somatic input is less intense and/or 
localized, that is, where there is more room for priors to impact symptom perception, which is 
consistent with gender effects becoming typically evident in the symptom ratings of healthy 
groups, and in assessments of MUS, somatoform disorders, functional somatic syndromes and 
organic pathology (Barsky et al., 2001). It also suggests that the gender difference will be 
more pronounced in somatic disease with a broader range of low intensity symptoms than in 
acute conditions with a smaller number of intense and localized symptoms, with this 
difference becoming more pronounced over time as associations between contextual factors 
and symptom episodes develop. 
2.4.4. Threat and negative affect (NA). Elevated physical symptom reporting is 
consistently associated with trait NA, as well as with anxiety states and affective disturbance, 
regardless of whether objective disease is present. Importantly, high NA appears to be a 
vulnerability factor for MUS when it interacts with increased self-focused attention (Gendolla 
et al., 2005), with previous experiences of somatic events and/or with somatic concerns 
(Bogaerts et al., 2014; Van den Bergh et al., 1997). As trait anxiety is associated with elevated 
sensitivity to threat (Hariri, 2009; Yiend, 2010) and compromised inhibitory systems for 
counter-regulating unpleasantness, it is likely that these mechanisms are involved in the 
association between high trait NA persons and MUS (Bishop, 2009; Montoya, et al., 2005; 
Tillisch et al., 2011; Van Oudenhove & Aziz, 2013). Recently, the concept of central 
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sensitization has been advanced to capture the idea of hyper-responsivity to various 
somatosensory stimuli in patients with functional somatic syndromes, characterized by 
elevated threat and salience detection, and a reduced capacity to down-regulate emotional 
responses (Bourke, Langford & White, 2015; Nijs et al., 2012 for reviews).   
Greater activation of affective networks and compromised inhibitory systems may generate 
augmented and imprecise interoceptive prediction errors (i.e., a greater discrepancy between 
predicted and actual interoceptive state; Paulus & Stein, 2006), whilst influencing the 
likelihood of priors being activated that predict the presence of threat, including symptoms in 
MUS-prone persons. Following Barrett and Bar (2009), we assume that the ‘gist’ of new 
stimuli are first captured and used to create initial predictions as a basis for further processing. 
This process, thought to be governed by the medial orbito-frontal cortex, instigates autonomic 
and endocrine changes representing predictions about the emotional and motivational 
significance of the signal, allowing stimuli to be categorized as either aversive, appetitive or 
neutral, and facilitating object recognition and motivating rapid action (e.g., approach, avoid) 
where appropriate. It also gives stimuli their hedonic tone (i.e., whether, and to what extent, 
they are experienced as pleasant or unpleasant; ibid). Stimuli that are characterized as 
potentially threatening or aversive at an early stage are afforded processing priority (e.g., 
Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013) aimed at reducing the threat and thereby 
minimizing prediction error.  
At the point of initial threat categorization, generative models are necessarily approximate: 
a detailed, contextually relevant generative model that accounts for the prediction errors 
follows later and evolves over time (Barrett & Bar, 2009; Kveraga et al., 2007). As such, the 
initial experience may simply be one of an aversive interoceptive experience associated with a 
non-specific sense that “something is wrong”. Evidence suggests that one way of reducing 
ambiguity about the cause of this experience might be to alter the sampling strategy (Barrett 
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& Simmons, 2015), by reducing detailed sensory-perceptual processing of the prediction 
errors and shifting the focus of representation to a simple categorization about the nature of 
the threat. Consistent with this, a set of studies requiring participants to categorize respiratory 
resistances of varying intensity levels (Petersen, Schroijen, Mölders, Zenker, & Van den 
Bergh, 2014) found that anxious persons showed poorer discrimination among within-
category interoceptive stimuli and fitted stimuli into categorical priors by taking less note of 
the variability resulting from sensory-discriminative processing (Procrustes effect; Petersen, 
Vögele, & Van den Bergh, submitted; Petersen, von Leupoldt, & Van den Bergh, 2015a). 
Anxiety was also related to an increasing lack of differentiation between interoceptive stimuli 
over time, a generalization process which may serve to disambiguate stimuli in the short term, 
but lead to higher error feedback over time. In another study, high anxious persons reporting 
high levels of symptoms in daily life misclassified low respiratory resistances close to the 
category border into a high category, indicating a liberal criterion for identifying stimuli as 
symptoms consistent with a “better safe than sorry” strategy (Petersen, Van Staeyen, von 
Leupoldt, Vögele, & Van den Bergh, 2015b). There is also evidence that anxiety during pain 
processing is associated with diminished perceptual discrimination of pain-related stimuli 
(Zaman et al., 2015). 
Other studies in high trait NA persons with MUS showed that self-reported symptoms 
became less strongly related to objective indicators of physiological dysfunction (as induced 
by CO2-inhalation) when the latter was administered in a negative affective context. This 
effect only appeared when participants were asked to rate “symptoms” (e.g., 
dyspnea/breathlessness) and not when rating neutrally labeled “sensations” (e.g., breathing 
intensity), showing that a reduction in sensory-perceptual detail is only applied when 
contextual cues advance symptom-related priors (Bogaerts et al., 2005; 2008; 2010b). Less 
detailed sensory-perceptual processing of somatic episodes in SSD patients may also underlie 
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the absence of a peak-end bias when evaluating previous somatic episodes (Bogaerts et al., 
2012) and less specific health-related autobiographical memories (Walentynowicz et al., 
2016). 
If detailed sensory-perceptual processing is reduced, interoceptive prediction errors will be 
imprecise, enabling high-level priors to become potent biasing factors of somatic experiences. 
There is evidence that patients with MUS hold more precise priors about “a normal body 
condition” (Rief et al., 1998) and have lower tolerance for uncertainty, leading to more 
prediction errors and thereby symptoms, especially when questioned about their somatic state. 
Also chronic somatic concerns may afford more weight to symptom-related priors, reducing 
detailed sensory-perceptual processing. This allows the prediction errors associated with 
negative affective states to be construed as somatic symptoms when conditions promote 
symptom-related priors, a finding that has been observed consistently with high NA persons 
in a negative affective state (Bogaerts et al., 2010a; Constantinou et al., 2013). Indeed, in a 
state of chronic uncertainty and stagnated error reduction, it may be adaptive to take an 
inferential leap on the basis of insufficient data, adopting a model that explains away 
somatosensory prediction errors and paradoxically reduces the overall level of threat; in other 
words, it may be better to know that you are ill than to be unsure whether you are (i.e., “better 
the devil you know”). Whilst disambiguation may serve a short term goal of reduced aversive 
feedback, however, it sustains a high error rate in the long run; the result is chronic negative 
affect and further attempts at disambiguation, expressed as chronic worry about the state 
(Carleton et al., 2014) and the creation of a vicious circle that ultimately leads to chronic 
MUS and somatoform disorders.   
2.5. Summary  
One of the main advantages of the model described here is that it integrates research and 
theory from separate literatures – those on MUS and those on symptom reporting more 
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generally – within a unifying framework that specifies how symptoms come to be perceived, 
and the conditions under which objective and subjective health markers diverge. In this new 
model, the conscious experience of a somatic symptom comes about as a result of the 
continuous interplay between expectations and evidence where specific factors and conditions 
specify the relative weight of both sources of information in determining the eventual 
experience (see Figure 3).  
------------------Insert Figure 3 about here-------------------- 
An advantage of the model is that a categorical boundary between MUS and medically 
explained symptoms is replaced by a process that allows gradual and context-dependent 
changes in the relationship between objective health markers and self-reported symptoms, and 
in which MUS emerge as extreme (but common) instances of this process. It also helps to 
understand how symptoms that initially were closely linked to objective disease indicators 
eventually may become decoupled from it, why there is a predominance of women showing 
MUS, and why threat sensitive individuals are more prone to develop MUS. The model also 
describes several mechanisms contributing to the maintenance of symptoms and their 
development into chronic complaints, which are relevant regardless of how much the 
symptoms correspond to objective disease indicators.   
 
3. Implications 
We conclude by briefly highlighting some of the implications of the model at different 
levels.  
3.1. Theoretical Implications 
 A central premise of this framework is that the brain can only make sense of the world 
by being sensitive to statistical regularities in its own neural activity. Moreover, how and how 
well we perceive our internal state is always contextualized, that is, predicated on specific 
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factors within the person and context, meaning that the “truthfulness” of perception is always 
relative. These aspects have a number of important implications. 
First, in order to understand MUS, the main issue may not be whether interoception is 
accurate or inaccurate, but why and how MUS become valid (i.e., are adaptive) in a pragmatic 
sense (Petersen, Van den Berg, Janssens, & Van den Bergh, 2011). Whilst it is likely that 
adaptive models of the world often correspond closely with regularities in the stimulation, 
less accurate or even distorted models may sometimes be more useful if they are efficient 
(i.e., minimize the amount of time and energy needed to test them) and predict important 
events well enough (Kruglanski, 1989; Lynn & Barrett, 2014). This highlights the need for 
studies that test aspects of symptom perception such as the precision of priors and the 
decision strategies used to classify sensations as noise or signal (i.e., “normal” or 
“symptom”). A window into confidence in perceptual hypotheses may be offered by intra-
individual variance in the perception of the same stimulus, as precision is the inverse of 
variability (inverse dispersion). The perceiver may or may not be aware of this 
variance/confidence, however.   
Second, contrary to the somatosensory amplification model, and perhaps common clinical 
wisdom, our account assumes that there is no necessary relationship between interoceptive 
sensitivity as investigated in studies assessing detection thresholds for interoceptive 
stimulation and symptom reports of physiological dysfunction. Although sensitivity may have 
a bearing on whether a sensation reaches awareness, symptom perception and reporting is 
more a matter of classifying those sensations into categories associated with threat. Context 
plays a crucial role in this process, as predictions and their associated precision weights differ 
dramatically from one situation to the next. Counting heart beats in an experimental context is 
quite different, for example, from perceiving heart beats whilst walking up the stairs, having 
just read a newspaper story about the sudden cardiac arrest and death of a celebrity.  
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 Third, moderators or individual risk factors for MUS, such as NA or gender, are not 
factors influencing a supervising agent (or self) that perceives the internal state, but contribute 
directly to perception itself. Since interoception is a continuous process in which hypotheses 
are tested and adapted in multiple trials, moderating traits act as inherent characteristics of the 
algorithms underlying the perceptual process and not as an external factor influencing 
perception. Since the precision of prior distributions rather than their central tendency will 
affect information seeking and thereby model adjustment, a shift in research from means to 
the precision of distributions is needed. 
3.2. Clinical Implications 
3.2.1. Diagnostic implications. As the brain creates educated guesses about somatic 
stimulation based on likelihoods, it is important to test not only the end-product of 
interoception (e.g., classification of a sensation, estimates of intensity, unpleasantness, 
location), but also the interoceptive process itself. It could therefore be informative for health 
care professionals to be able to assess the nature and precision of their patients’ priors and the 
disambiguation and classification strategies they use in relation to interoceptive information. 
Several benefits may emerge from developing the present perspective into diagnostic 
strategies. First, if bias in interoception is not regarded as “measurement error”, but as the 
patient’s best guess resulting from a specific mental model, this takes away any blame or 
stigma towards them for being wrong in an absolute sense. Second, the boundaries between 
normal and pathological cases would become blurred because any symptom report can be 
disconnected from objective physiological indicators to some extent, depending on the 
context and history of the person. This would at the same time acknowledge the empirical 
evidence that MUS vary in a dimensional way and occur in “objective disease” as well as in 
the absence of it. Third, assessing mediating processes rather than end-products points 
directly to intervention strategies, consistent with current calls to move away from labels and 
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categorical diagnoses and to focus on transdiagnostic markers and processes (RDoC initiative, 
Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). We believe that the development of diagnostic tools focusing on 
intra-individual variability in classifying the same interoceptive stimulus, and on variations in 
disambiguation and classification strategies as a function of contextual cues, may provide 
valuable information in this respect.  
3.2.2.Treatment implications. Following the modal models in this area, the dominant 
treatment strategies involve the development of various self-help techniques such as  (1) 
reducing physiological arousal (e.g., through relaxation); (2) altering interoceptive 
(hyper)vigilance; and (3) correcting (catastrophic) misinterpretations of somatic sensations. 
Studies of psychological treatments for MUS in general show relatively low effect sizes 
(Kleinstäuber, Witthöft, & Hiller, 2011; Van Dessel et al., 2014) and there is much room for 
improvement. A major weakness the somatosensory amplification and signal filtering models 
have in common is that they do not flesh out the process by which conscious symptom 
experiences come about in the first place. In the present model, symptoms emerge in 
consciousness when the generative model with the lowest overall prediction error and best 
ratio of complexity and efficiency represents an interoceptive event with an abnormal or 
disease cause. However, the processes and interoceptive algorithms that lead to that 
experience are not available for introspection (i.e., are outside awareness), which results in a 
strong and immediate feeling that one’s somatic experience is trustworthy (“sensing is 
believing”). Since this process is the same whether there is a close correlation with objective 
disease indicators or not, it fits with the perspective of the patient who experiences no 
difference between MUS and non-MUS symptoms.  
 Breaking the "sensing is believing" cycle and encouraging the formation of new generative 
models may require specific experiences repeated over time. Interoceptive exposure therapy is 
probably the most fruitful track to follow but the technique may need further fine-tuning. In 
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its present form it is intended to reduce interoceptive fear, that is, to reduce confidence in the 
immediate negative outcome of a sensation, which may also implicitly increase tolerance for 
uncertainty. From the present perspective, however, it is also necessary to reduce confidence 
in the presence of a sensation/symptom itself (sensing is believing) as well as to increase the 
perceived heterogeneity of sensation and symptom categories. To reduce implicit confidence 
that a sensation is a symptom, training people to become more sensitive to differences in 
interoceptive sensations may be more helpful (Schaefer, Egloff, Gerlach, & Witthöft, 2014). 
This may be achieved by shifting the level of representation under conditions of threat from 
affective-categorical to sensory-perceptual, thereby reducing the weight of the priors. 
Collectively these therapeutic strategies might be termed “interoceptive differentiation 
training”.     
3.3 Translating The Model Into Testable Hypotheses 
The model points to several obvious and important challenges for research, including the 
independent assessment of priors, prediction errors and their relative precisions at the neural 
levels, how they are influenced by contextual variables and individual differences, and how 
they relate to behavioral processes. A more general implication can be derived from the 
central assumption in our approach, namely that the brain compresses information into classes 
that optimize the balance between redundancy and loss of unique information (Chater & 
Vitányi, 2003; Seger & Peterson, 2013). This categorization process involves implicit 
inferences about causes and consequences of the stimulation, resulting from the interplay 
between the distributions of priors and prediction errors. This focus on distributions is 
different from the traditional view that typically assesses mean values such as the location of 
a sensation on a magnitude or unpleasantness scale, and tends to consider intra-individual 
variance as measurement error. In contrast, we suggest that variance is a valuable window 
into confidence, that is, into the precision of prior and posterior distributions (defining 
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precision as inverse dispersion). Intra-individual variance can pertain to the same stimulus 
(ratings by one person for one stimulus presented repeatedly to investigate the role of 
situational factors or dynamic changes over time) or to different stimuli (sensitivity for 
differences between interoceptive stimuli). Intra-individual variance in processing complexity 
(i.e.,  the number and degree of independence of interoceptive dimensions involved in 
stimulus evaluation) may also provide useful information. For example, pain can be sharp and 
not dull, and dyspnea can feel more like air hunger than chest tightness. When category 
complexity and inter-dimensional variance are reduced, categories become more inclusive 
(more sensations fit the simplified prototype) and misclassification is more likely for 
symptom categories that are represented in this simplified fashion.  
An example of this approach is a recent study in which a set of equidistant respiratory 
resistances varying in intensity was administered to a group of healthy participants. 
Subsequently, the lower resistances were artificially grouped into category A, and the higher 
resistances were grouped into category B. Inducing these artificial categories caused both 
assimilation and accentuation effects, that is, the perceived differences between stimuli within 
categories were suppressed while the differences between categories were accentuated 
(Petersen et al., 2014). These findings clearly illustrate the role of interoceptive categories as 
priors.  
Such methods may reveal how contextual, state and trait-related individual difference 
variables change the processing algorithms underlying symptom perception. Some effects 
may result from the relative impact of specific (types of) priors, while other effects may result 
from different sensitivities to detect sensory-perceptual differences, or from implicitly used 
decision strategies to classify sensations. For example, a recent study showed that threat 
sensitivity is positively associated with the degree to which interoceptive information 
processing is condensed by assimilation and accentuation, and with a sense of increased 
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certainty about one’s classifications (Petersen et al., 2015b). The curtailment of detailed 
sensory-perceptual processing and the disambiguation of interoceptive information via 
assimilation and accentuation (allowing for an inferential leap) could be regarded as a quick 
and dirty categorization strategy that may be appropriate if resources are low and/or the need 
for disambiguation (error reduction) is high. (e.g., a liberal “better safe than sorry” strategy; 
see Petersen et al., 2015b; supra).  
 These are just a few examples of how the present perspective suggests novel research 
methods for studying interoceptive processing and symptom perception, shedding new light 
on how symptom experiences relate to objective bodily events. 
 
4. Summary And Conclusions 
 The basic assumption underlying the model presented here is that the brain makes sense 
of the internal state of the body by being sensitive to statistical regularities in its own neural 
activity. It does this by compressing information into categories in a parsimonious way, 
optimizing the balance between redundancy and loss of unique information, in order to form 
mental representations of the bodily state. These representations (generative models) exist at 
multiple hierarchical levels and are continuously shaped and refined by mapping neural 
activity representing prior expectations onto incoming afferent activity. This inferential 
process eventually results in abstract categorical representations reaching awareness, for 
example, in the form of consciously felt pain, weakness or breathlessness. We propose that 
consciously experienced symptoms reflect the generative model with the lowest overall 
prediction error representing an interoceptive event with an abnormal (typically disease) 
cause. Depending on specific conditions, the percept of the body may be more influenced by 
prior expectations or by actual inputs (prediction errors).  
We conclude by listing what we consider to be the major strengths of the model. First, the 
dynamic interplay between priors and prediction errors at multiple hierarchical levels results 
47 
in a dimensional variation of the relationship between subjectively experienced physical 
symptoms and objective physical dysfunction. This is consistent with a wealth of evidence 
showing that the strength of this relationship varies enormously in organic disease; 
importantly, it accommodates MUS within the same framework, placing them at the extreme 
end of this dimension. Future work may consider how other seemingly anomalous 
phenomena, such as placebo, nocebo, phantom limb pain, and hypnotic effects could be 
understood using a similar framework (Büchel et al., 2014). One consequence of this 
approach is that medicine, in order to become truly patient-focused, needs to go beyond the 
biopsychosocial perspective and embrace a symptom perception model. Second, the 
relationship between the experience of physical symptoms and objective physical dysfunction 
is always contextualized, that is, influenced by specific factors within the historical person, 
the context, and their interaction. This means that the relationship between symptoms and 
physiological dysfunction may vary substantially both within-person and within-situation. 
Third, the model de-emphasizes the importance of “accuracy” in symptom perception and 
promotes the importance of understanding its validity and utility in a pragmatic sense. This 
shift in emphasis has important theoretical and clinical consequences. Fourth, clinical 
intervention should more explicitly target those inferential processes leading to the 
phenomenal experience of symptoms as “really there”. Fifth, and most importantly, a 
predictive coding framework may suggest novel behavioral paradigms as well as new 
measurement parameters for testing critical predictions. By extending these approaches to 
include neurobiological paradigms, we hope to provide an antidote to a narrow disease model 
and the unhelpful separation of psyche and soma.    
48 
References 
Aamland, A., Malterud, K., & Werner, E. L. (2014). Patients with persistent medically 
unexplained physical symptoms: a descriptive study from Norwegian general practice. 
BMC family practice, 15(1), 1. 
Afzal, M., Potokar, J. P., Probert, C. S., & Munafò, M. R. (2006). Selective processing of 
gastrointestinal symptom-related stimuli in irritable bowel syndrome. Psychosomatic 
Medicine, 68, 758-761. doi: 10.1097/01.psy.0000232270.78071.28 
Agusti, A., Calverley, P. M., Celli, B., Coxson, H. O., Edwards, L. D., Lomas, D. A., ... & 
Tal-Singer, R. (2010). Characterisation of COPD heterogeneity in the ECLIPSE cohort. 
Respiratory research, 11(1), 1-14. 
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders: (DSM-5®). American Psychiatric Pub. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425596 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders: text revision (DSM-IV-TR). American Psychiatric Pub. 
Atarashi, H., Ogawa, S., & Inoue, H. (2008). Relationship between subjective symptoms and 
trans-telephonic ECG findings in patients with symptomatic paroxysmal atrial fibrillation 
and flutter. Journal of Cardiology, 52, 102-110. doi: 10.1016/j.jjcc.2008.06.006 
Atlas, L. Y., & Wager, T. D. (2014). A meta-analysis of brain mechanisms of placebo 
analgesia: Consistent findings and unanswered questions. In F. Bendetti, P. Enck, E. 
Frisaldi, & M. Schedlowski (Eds.), Placebo (pp. 37-69). Berlin: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. 
Barrett, L. F., & Bar, M. (2009). See it with feeling: Affective predictions during object 
perception. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364, 
1325-1334. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0312 
49 
Barrett, L. F., & Simmons, W. K. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience. 16, 1-11. doi:10.1038/nrn3950 
Barsky, A. J. (2001). Palpitations, arrhythmias, and awareness of cardiac activity. Annals of 
Internal Medicine, 134, 832-837. doi:10.7326/0003-4819-134-9_Part_2-200105011-00006 
Barsky, A. J., Orav, E. J., & Bates, D. W. (2005). Somatization increases medical utilization 
and costs independent of psychiatric and medical comorbidity. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 62, 903-910. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.62.8.903 
Barsky, A. J., Peekna, H. M., & Borus, J. F. (2001). Somatic symptom reporting in women 
and men. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 16(4), 266-275. 
Barsky, A. J., & Wyshak, G. (1990). Hypochondriasis and somatosensory amplification. The 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 404-409. 
Bermingham, S. L., Cohen, A., Hague, J., & Parsonage, M. (2010). The cost of somatisation 
among the working-age population in England for the year 2008–2009. Mental Health in 
Family Medicine, 7, 71. 
Berthoud, H. R., & Neuhuber, W. L. (2000). Functional and chemical anatomy of the afferent 
vagal system. Autonomic Neuroscience, 85(1), 1-17. 
Bishop, S. J. (2009). Trait anxiety and impoverished prefrontal control of attention. Nature 
Neuroscience, 12, 92-8. doi:10.1038/nn.2242 
Blundell, S., Ray, K. K., Buckland, M., & White, P. D. (2015). Chronic fatigue syndrome and 
circulating cytokines: A systematic review. Brain, behavior, and immunity, 50, 186-195. 
Bogaerts, K., Janssens, T., De Peuter, S., Van Diest, I., Van den Bergh, O. (2010a). Negative 
affective pictures can elicit physical symptoms in high habitual symptom reporters. 
Psychology & Health, 25, 685-98. doi: 10.1080/08870440902814639 
Bogaerts, K., Millen, A., Li, W., De Peuter, S., Van Diest, I., Vlemincx, E., Fannes, S., & 
Van den Bergh, O. (2008). High symptom reporters are less interoceptively accurate in a 
50 
symptom-related context. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 65, 417-424.        
doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2008.03.019 
Bogaerts, K., Notebaert, K., Van Diest, I., Devriese, S., De Peuter, S., & Van den Bergh, O. 
(2005). Accuracy of respiratory symptom perception in different affective contexts. 
Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 58, 537-543. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2004.12.005 
Bogaerts, K., Rayen, L., Lavrysen, A., Van Diest, I., Janssens, T., Schruers, K., & Van den 
Bergh, O. (2014). Unraveling the relationship between trait negative affectivity and 
habitual symptom reporting. PloS One, 10. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0115748. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0115748 
Bogaerts, K., Van Eylen, L., Li, W., Bresseleers, J., Van Diest, I., De Peuter, S., Stans, L., 
Decramer, M., & Van den Bergh, O. (2010b). Distorted symptom perception in patients 
with medically unexplained symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 119, 226. doi: 
10.1037/a0017780 
Bogaerts, K., Wan, L., Van Diest, I., Stans, L., Decramer, M., & Van den Bergh, O. (2012). 
Peak-end memory bias in laboratory-induced dyspnea: a comparison of patients with 
medically unexplained symptoms and healthy controls. Psychosomatic Medicine, 74, 974-
981. doi: 10.1097/PSY.0b013e318273099c 
Borchers, A. T., & Gershwin, M. E. (2015). Fibromyalgia: a critical and comprehensive 
review. Clinical reviews in allergy & immunology, 49(2), 100-151. 
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature, 391, 756-
756. doi:10.1038/35784 
51 
Bourke, J. H., Langford, R. M., & White, P. D. (2015). The common link between functional 
somatic syndromes may be central sensitization. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 78, 
228-36. 
Brown, R. J. (2004). Psychological mechanisms of medically unexplained symptoms: An 
integrative conceptual model. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 793. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.130.5.793 
Brown, R. J. (2006). Medically unexplained symptoms: A new model. Psychiatry, 5, 43-47.         
doi:10.1383/psyt.2006.5.2.43 
Brown, R. J. (2007). Introduction to the special issue on medically unexplained symptoms: 
Background and future directions. Clinical Psychology Review, 27, 769-780. 
doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2007.07.003 
Brown, R. J. (2013). Dissociation and somatoform disorders. In F. Kennedy, H. Kennerley & 
D. Pearson (Eds.), Cognitive behavioural approaches to the understanding and treatment 
of dissociation (pp. 133-147). London: Routledge. 
Brown, R. J., Danquah, A. N., Miles, E., Holmes, E., & Poliakoff, E. (2010). Attention to the 
body in nonclinical somatoform dissociation depends on emotional state. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 69, 249-257. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2010.04.010 
Brown, R. J., Poliakoff, E., & Kirkman, M. A. (2007). Somatoform dissociation and 
somatosensory amplification are differentially associated with attention to the tactile 
modality following exposure to body-related stimuli. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 
62, 159-165. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2006.08.008 
Brown, R. J. & Reuber, M. (2016). Towards an integrative theory of psychogenic non-
epileptic seizures (PNES). Clinical Psychology Review, 47, 155-170. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2016.06.003. 
52 
Brown, R. J., Skehan, D., Chapman, A., Perry, E. P., McKenzie, K. J., Lloyd, D. M., Babbs, 
C., Paine, P., & Poliakoff, E. (2012). Physical symptom reporting is associated with a 
tendency to experience somatosensory distortion. Psychosomatic Medicine, 74, 648-655. 
doi: 10.1097/PSY.0b013e3182595358 
Büchel, C., Geuter, S., Sprenger, C., & Eippert, F. (2014). Placebo analgesia: A predictive 
coding perspective. Neuron, 81, 1223-1239. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.02.042 
Carleton, R. N., Duranceau, S., Freeston, M. H., Boelen, P. A., McCabe, R. E., & Antony, M. 
M. (2014). “But it might be a heart attack”: Intolerance of uncertainty and panic disorder 
symptoms. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 28, 463-470. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2014.04.006 
Chapman, S., & Martin, M. (2011). Attention to pain words in irritable bowel syndrome: 
Increased orienting and speeded engagement. British Journal of Health Psychology, 16, 
47-60. doi: 10.1348/135910710X505887 
Chater, N., & Vitányi, P. (2003). Simplicity: A unifying principle in cognitive science? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 19-22. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(02)00005-0 
Cioffi, D. (1991). Beyond attentional strategies: A cognitive-perceptual model of somatic 
interpretation. Psychological Bulletin, 109, 25-41. doi: 10.1037//0033-2909.109.1.25  
Claassen-van Dessel, N., van der Wouden, J. C., Dekker, J., & van der Horst, H. E. (2016). 
Clinical value of DSM IV and DSM 5 criteria for diagnosing the most prevalent 
somatoform disorders in patients with medically unexplained physical symptoms (MUPS). 
Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 82, 4-10. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2016.01.004 
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of 
cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, 181-204. doi: 
10.1017/S0140525X12000477 
53 
Cloninger, C. R., Martin, R. L., Guze, S. B., & Clayton, P. J. (1986). A prospective follow-up 
and family study of somatization in men and women. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
143(7), 873-878. 
Constantinou, E., Bogaerts, K., Van Diest, I., & Van den Bergh, O. (2013). Inducing 
symptoms in high symptom reporters via emotional pictures: The interactive effects of 
valence and arousal. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 74, 191-196. doi: 
10.1016/j.jpsychores.2012.12.015 
Constantinou, E., Van Den Houte, M., Bogaerts, K., Van Diest, I., & Van den Bergh, O. 
(2015). Can words heal? Using labeling to reduce the effects of unpleasant cues on 
symptom reporting. Frontiers in Psychology: Emotion Science, 5, 807. doi. 
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00807. 
Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven 
attention in the brain. Nature reviews neuroscience, 3(3), 201-215. 
Craig, A. D. (2002). How do you feel? Interoception: The sense of the physiological 
condition of the body. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3, 655-666. doi:10.1038/nrn894 
Craig, A. D. (2009). How do you feel now? The anterior insula and human awareness. Nature 
Review Neuroscience, 10, 59-70. doi:10.1038/nrn2555 
Craig, T. K., Boardman, A. P., Mills, K., Daly-Jones, O., & Drake, H. (1993). The South 
London Somatisation Study. I: Longitudinal course and the influence of early life 
experiences. British Journal of Psychiatry, 163, 579-588. doi: 10.1192/bjp.163.5.579 
Creed, F., Guthrie, E., Fink, P., Henningsen, P., Rief, W., Sharpe, M., & White, P. (2010). Is 
there a better term than “medically unexplained symptoms”? Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 68, 5-8. dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2009.09.004 
Critchley, H. D., & Harrison, N. A. (2013). Visceral influences on brain and behavior. 
Neuron, 77, 624-638. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.02.008 
54 
Cuthbert, B. N., & Insel, T. R. (2013). Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: The seven 
pillars of RDoC. BMC Medicine, 11, 126. 
Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind. New York: Pantheon. 
Deary, V., Chalder, T., & Sharpe, M. (2007). The cognitive behavioural model of medically 
unexplained symptoms: A theoretical and empirical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 
27, 781-797. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2007.07.002 
Derbyshire, S. W., Whalley, M. G., Stenger, V. A., & Oakley, D. A. (2004). Cerebral 
activation during hypnotically induced and imagined pain. Neuroimage, 23, 392-401.        
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.04.033 
De Peuter, S., Van Diest, I., Lemaigre, V., Li, W., Verleden, G., Demedts, M., Van den 
Bergh, O. (2005). Can subjective asthma symptoms be learned? Psychosomatic Medicine, 
67, 454-461. 
De Ruiter, C., & Brosschot, J. F. (1994). The emotional Stroop interference effect in anxiety: 
attentional bias or cognitive avoidance. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 315-319. 
doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)90128-7 
Doom, J. R., Cicchetti, D., Rogosch, F. A., & Dackis, M. N. (2013). Child maltreatment and 
gender interactions as predictors of differential neuroendocrine profiles. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 38(8), 1442-1454. 
Douzenis, A., & Seretis, D. (2013). Descriptive and predictive validity of somatic attributions 
in patients with somatoform disorders: a systematic review of quantitative research. 
Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 75, 199-210. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2013.05.005 
Edwards, M. J., Adams, R. A., Brown, H., Pareés, I., & Friston, K. J. (2012). A Bayesian 
account of ‘hysteria’. Brain, 135, 3495-3512. doi: 10.1093/brain/aws129 
Edwards, V. J., Holden, G. W., Felitti, V. J., & Anda, R. F. (2003). Relationship between 
multiple forms of childhood maltreatment and adult mental health in community 
55 
respondents: results from the adverse childhood experiences study. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 160(8), 1453-1460. 
Eisenberger, N. I., Inagaki, T. K., Rameson, L. T., Mashal, N. M., & Irwin, M. R. (2009). An 
fMRI study of cytokine-induced depressed mood and social pain: The role of sex 
differences. NeuroImage, 47, 881–890. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.04.040 
Enck, P., Benedetti, F., & Schedlowski, M. (2008). New insights into the placebo and nocebo 
responses. Neuron, 59, 195-206. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.06.030 
Enck, P., Bingel, U., Schedlowski, M., & Rief, W. (2013). The placebo response in medicine: 
Minimize, maximize or personalize? Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 12, 191-204. doi: 
10.1038/nrd3923 
Fairclough, S. H., & Goodwin, L. (2007). The effect of psychological stress and relaxation on 
interoceptive accuracy: Implications for symptom perception. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 62(3), 289-295. 
Fass, R., Naliboff, B. D., Fass, S. S., Peleg, N., Wendel, C., Malagon, I. B., & Mayer, E. A. 
(2008). The effect of auditory stress on perception of intraesophageal acid in patients with 
gastroesophageal reflux disease. Gastroenterology, 134, 696-705.        
doi:10.1053/j.gastro.2007.12.010 
Feldman, H., & Friston, K. J. (2010). Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 4, 215. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00215 
Fink, P., Toft, T., Hansen, M. S., Ørnbøl, E., & Olesen, F. (2007). Symptoms and syndromes 
of bodily distress: An exploratory study of 978 internal medical, neurological, and primary 
care patients. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69, 30-39. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2010.02.004 
Frankum, S., & Ogden, J. (2005). Estimation of blood glucose levels by people with diabetes: 
A cross-sectional study. British Journal of General Practice, 55, 944-948. 
56 
Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences, 360, 815-836. doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1622 
Friston, K. (2008). Hierarchical models in the brain. PLoS Computational Biology, 4. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000211. 
Gazouli, M., Wouters, M. M., Kapur-Pojskić, L., Bengtson, M. B., Friedman, E., Nikčević, 
G., ... & Niesler, B. (2016). Lessons learned - resolving the enigma of genetic factors in 
IBS. Nature Reviews Gastroenterology & Hepatology, 13, 77-87. doi: 
10.1038/nrgastro.2015.206 
Gendolla, G. H., Abele, A. E., Andrei, A., Spurk, D., & Richter, M. (2005). Negative mood, 
self-focused attention, and the experience of physical symptoms: The joint impact 
hypothesis. Emotion, 5, 131. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.5.2.131 
Geniats, T. G. (2015). Redifining the chronic fatigue syndrome. Annals of Internal Medicine, 
162, 653-654. doi: 10.7326/M15-0357 
Gianaros, P. J., Horenstein, J. A., Cohen, S., Matthews, K. A., Brown, S. M., Flory, J. D., . . . 
Hariri, A. R. (2007). Perigenual anterior cingulate morphology covaries with perceived 
social standing. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2, 161–173. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsm013 
Goedendorp, M. M., van der Werf, S. P., Bleijenberg, G., Tummers, M., & Knoop, H. (2013). 
Does neuropsychological test performance predict outcome of cognitive behavior therapy 
for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and what is the role of underperformance? Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 75, 242-248. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2013.07.011 
Gracely, R. H., Petzke, F., Wolf, J. M., & Clauw, D. J. (2002). Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging evidence of augmented pain processing in fibromyalgia. Arthritis & Rheumatism, 
46(5), 1333-1343. 
57 
Gregory, R. L. (1980). Perceptions as hypotheses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences, 290, 181-197. 
Hariri, A. R. (2009). The neurobiology of individual differences in complex behavioral traits. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 32, 225-247. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.051508.135335 
Harrison, N. A., Brydon, L., Walker, C., Gray, M. A., Steptoe, A., & Critchley, H. D. 
(2009a). Inflammation causes mood changes through alterations in subgenual cingulate 
activity and mesolimbic connectivity. Biological psychiatry, 66(5), 407-414. 
Harrison, N. A., Brydon, L., Walker, C., Gray, M. A., Steptoe, A., Dolan, R. J., & Critchley, 
H. D. (2009b). Neural origins of human sickness in interoceptive responses to 
inflammation. Biological psychiatry, 66(5), 415-422. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.03.007 
Harshaw, C. (2015). Interoceptive dysfunction: Toward an integrated framework for 
understanding somatic and affective disturbance in depression. Psychological bulletin, 
141(2), 311. 
Hechler, T., Endres, D., & Thorwart, A. (2016). Why harmless sensations might hurt in 
individuals with chronic pain: About heightened prediction and perception of pain in the 
mind. Frontiers in Psychology, 7. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01638 
Helmholtz, H. V. (1860). Theorie der Luftschwingungen in Röhren mit offenen Enden. 
Journal für die Reine und Angewandte Mathematik, 57, 1-72. 
Henningsen, P., Zipfel, S., & Herzog, W. (2007). Management of functional somatic 
syndromes. The Lancet, 369, 946-955. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(07)60159-7 
Hiller, W., Cebulla, M., Korn, H. J., Leibbrand, R., Röers, B., & Nilges, P. (2010). Causal 
symptom attributions in somatoform disorder and chronic pain. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 68, 9-19. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2009.06.011 
58 
Hiller, W., Fichter, M. M., & Rief, W. (2003). A controlled treatment study of somatoform 
disorders including analysis of healthcare utilization and cost-effectiveness. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 54, 369-380. doi: 10.1016/S0022-3999(02)00397-5 
Hiller, W., Rief, W., & Brähler, E. (2006). Somatization in the population: From mild bodily 
misperceptions to disabling symptoms. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 
41, 704-712. doi: 10.1007/s00127-006-0082-y 
Hohwy, J. (2012). Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 96. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096 
Holliday, K. L., Macfarlane, G. J., Nicholl, B. I., Creed, F., Thomson, W., & McBeth, J. 
(2010). Genetic variation in neuroendocrine genes associates with somatic symptoms in 
the general population: Results from the EPIFUND study. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 68, 469-474. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2010.01.024 
Hou, R., Moss-Morris, R., Bradley, B. P., Peveler, R., & Mogg, K. (2008). Attentional bias 
towards health-threat information in chronic fatigue syndrome. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 65, 47-50. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2008.03.008 
Houtveen, J. H., Hamaker, E. L., & Van Doornen, L. J. (2010). Using multilevel path analysis 
in analyzing 24-h ambulatory physiological recordings applied to medically unexplained 
symptoms. Psychophysiology, 47, 570-578. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2009.00951.x 
Houtveen, J. H., & van Doornen, L. J. (2007). Medically unexplained symptoms and 
between-group differences in 24-h ambulatory recording of stress physiology. Biological 
Psychology, 76, 239-249. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2007.08.005 
Ishihara, S., Tada, Y., Fukuba, N., Oka, A., Kusunoki, R., Mishima, Y., ... & Kinoshita, Y. 
(2013). Pathogenesis of irritable bowel syndrome-review regarding associated infection 
and immune activation. Digestion, 87, 204-211. doi: 10.1159/000350054 
59 
Jana, A. K., Praharaj, S. K., & Mazumdar, J. (2012). Current debates over nosology of 
somatoform disorders. Industrial Psychiatry Journal, 21, 4-10. doi:  10.4103/0972-
6748.110939 
Janssens, T., Verleden, G., De Peuter, S., Van Diest, I., & Van den Bergh, O. (2009). 
Inaccurate perception of asthma symptoms: A cognitive–affective framework and 
implications for asthma treatment. Clinical Psychology Review, 29, 317-327. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2009.02.006 
Jasper, F., Hiller, W., Rist, F., Bailer, J., & Witthöft, M. (2012). Somatic symptom reporting 
has a dimensional latent structure: Results from taxometric analyses. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 121, 725-738. doi: 10.1037/a0028407 
Jasper, F., & Witthöft, M. (2013). Automatic evaluative processes in health anxiety and their 
relations to emotion regulation. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 37, 521-533. 
doi: 10.1007/s10608-012-9484-1 
Jensen, K., Kirsch, I., Odmalm, S., Kaptchuk, T. J., & Ingvar, M. (2015). Classical 
conditioning of analgesic and hyperalgesic pain responses without conscious awareness. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112, 7863-7867. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.1504567112  
Jubb, J., & Bensing, J. M. (2013). The sweetest pill to swallow: How patient neurobiology 
can be harnessed to maximise placebo effects. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 37, 
2709-2720. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.09.006 
Katzer, A., Hiller, W., Oberfeld, D., & Witthöft, M. (2011). Tactile perceptual processes and 
their relationship to medically unexplained symptoms and health anxiety. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 71, 335-341. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2011.03.009 
60 
Katzer, A., Oberfeld, D., Hiller, W., Gerlach, A. L., & Witthöft, M. (2012). Tactile perceptual 
processes and their relationship to somatoform disorders. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 121, 530. doi: 10.1037/a0026536 
Kim, S. E., & Chang, L. (2012). Overlap between functional GI disorders and other functional 
syndromes: What are the underlying mechanisms? Neurogastroenterology & Motility, 24, 
895-913. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2982.2012.01993.x 
Kirmayer, L. J., & Taillefer, S. (1997). Somatoform disorder. In S. M. Turner & M. Hersen 
(eds.), Adult psychopathology and diagnosis, (2nd ed., pp. 333-383). New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Kirmayer, L. J., Groleau, D., Looper, K. J., & Dao, M. D. (2004). Explaining medically 
unexplained symptoms. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 49, 663-672. doi: 
10.1177/070674370404901003 
Kleinstäuber, M., Witthöft, M., & Hiller, W. (2011). Efficacy of short-term psychotherapy for 
multiple medically unexplained physical symptoms: A meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 31, 146-160. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2010.09.001 
Kolk, A. M., Hanewald, G. J., Schagen, S., & van Wijk, C. M. G. (2003). A symptom 
perception approach to common physical symptoms. Social Science & Medicine, 57, 2343-
2354. doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(02)00451-3 
Körber, S., Frieser, D., Steinbrecher, N., & Hiller, W. (2011). Classification characteristics of 
the Patient Health Questionnaire-15 for screening somatoform disorders in a primary care 
setting. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 71, 142-147. doi: 
10.1016/j.jpsychores.2011.01.006 
Kroenke, K. (2003). Patients presenting with somatic complaints: Epidemiology, psychiatric 
co-morbidity and management. International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 
12, 34-43. 
61 
Kroenke, K., Sharpe, M., & Sykes, R. (2007). Revising the classification of somatoform 
disorders: Key questions and preliminary recommendations. Psychosomatics, 48, 277-285. 
doi: 10.1176/appi.psy.48.4.277 
Kroenke, K., & Spitzer, R. L. (1998). Gender differences in the reporting of physical and 
somatoform symptoms. Psychosomatic Medicine, 60(2), 150-155. 
Kroenke, K., Spitzer, R. L., DeGruy, F. V., Hahn, S. R., Linzer, M., Williams, J. B., Brody, 
D., & Davies, M. (1997). Multisomatoform disorder: An alternative to undifferentiated 
somatoform disorder for the somatizing patient in primary care. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 54, 352-358. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1997.01830160080011 
Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). The psychology of being" right": The problem of accuracy in 
social perception and cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 395-409. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.106.3.395 
Kveraga, K., Ghuman, A. S., & Bar, M. (2007). Top-down predictions in the cognitive brain. 
Brain and Cognition, 65, 145-168. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2007.06.007 
Landgrebe, M., Barta, W., Rosengarth, K., Frick, U., Hauser, S., Langguth, B., Rutschmann, 
R., Greenlee, M. W., Hajak, G., & Eichhammer, P. (2008). Neuronal correlates of 
symptom formation in functional somatic syndromes: A fMRI study. Neuroimage, 41, 
1336-1344. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.04.171 
Leventhal, H., Diefenbach, M., & Leventhal, E. A. (1992). Illness cognition: Using common 
sense to understand treatment adherence and affect cognition interactions. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 16, 143-163. doi: 10.1007/BF01173486 
Leventhal, H., & Leventhal, E. A. (1993). Affect, cognition, and symptom perception. In K. 
M. Foley & C. R. Chapman, (Eds.), Current and emerging issues in cancer pain: Research 
and practice (pp. 153-73). Raven Press. 
62 
Leventhal, H., Leventhal, E. A., & Contrada, R. J. (1998). Self-regulation, health, and 
behavior: A perceptual-cognitive approach. Psychology and Health, 13, 717-733. doi:    
10.1080/08870449808407425 
Lim, S. L., & Kim, J. H. (2005). Cognitive processing of emotional information in depression, 
panic, and somatoform disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114, 50. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.114.1.50 
Liston, C., McEwen, B. S., & Casey, B. J. (2009). Psychosocial stress reversibly disrupts 
prefrontal processing and attentional control. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, USA, 106, 912–917. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0807041106 
Lynn, S. K., & Barrett, L. F. (2014). “Utilizing” signal detection theory. Psychological 
Science, 25, 1663-1673. doi: 10.1177/0956797614541991 
Marcus, D. K., Gurley, J. R., Marchi, M. M., & Bauer, C. (2007). Cognitive and perceptual 
variables in hypochondriasis and health anxiety: A systematic review. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 27, 127-139. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2006.09.003 
Martin, M., & Alexeeva, I. (2010). Mood volatility with rumination but neither attentional nor 
interpretation biases in chronic fatigue syndrome. British Journal of Health Psychology, 
15, 779-796. doi: 10.1348/135910709X480346 
Martin, M., & Chapman, S. C. (2010). Cognitive processing in putative functional 
gastrointestinal disorder: Rumination yields orientation to social threat not pain. European 
Journal of Pain, 14, 207-213. doi:10.1016/j.ejpain.2009.04.008 
Montoya, P., Sitges, C., García-Herrera, M., Izquierdo, R., Truyols, M., Blay, N., & Collado, 
D. (2005). Abnormal affective modulation of somatosensory brain processing among 
patients with fibromyalgia. Psychosomatic Medicine, 67, 957-63. 
63 
Müllerová, H., Lu, C., Li, H., & Tabberer, M. (2014). Prevalence and burden of 
breathlessness in patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease managed in primary 
care. PloS one, 9(1), e85540. 
Mussgay, L., Klinkenberg, N., & Rüddel, H. (1999). Heart beat perception in patients with 
depressive, somatoform, and personality disorders. Journal of Psychophysiology, 13, 27-
36. doi: 10.1027//0269-8803.13.1.27 
Nakao, M., & Barsky, A. J. (2007). Clinical application of somatosensory amplification in 
psychosomatic medicine. Biopsychosocial Medicine, 1, 17. doi:10.1186/1751-0759-1-17 
Naliboff, B. D., Berman, S., Chang, L., Derbyshire, S. W., Suyenobu, B., Vogt, B. A., ... & 
Mayer, E. A. (2003). Sex-related differences in IBS patients: central processing of visceral 
stimuli. Gastroenterology, 124(7), 1738-1747. 
Nijs, J., Meeus, M., Van Oosterwijck, J., Ickmans, K., Moorkens, G., Hans, G., & De Clerck, 
L. S. (2012). In the mind or in the brain? Scientific evidence for central sensitisation in 
chronic fatigue syndrome. European Journal of Clinical Investigation, 42, 203-212. doi: 
10.1111/j.1365-2362.2011.02575.x 
Norman, G. J., Berntson, G. G., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2014). Emotion, somatovisceral afference, 
and autonomic regulation. Emotion Review, 6(2), 113-123. 
Paulus, M. P., & Stein, M. B. (2006). An insular view of anxiety. Biological Psychiatry, 60, 
383-387. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2006.03.042 
Pennebaker, J.W., 1982. The psychology of physical symptoms. New York: Springer. 
Pennebaker, J. W. (1995). Beyond laboratory-based cardiac perception: Ecological 
interoception. In D. Vaitl, & R. Schandry (Eds.), From the heart to the brain. The 
psychophysiology of circulation - Brain interaction (pp. 389-406). Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
Pennebaker, J. W., & Roberts, T. A. (1992). Toward a his and hers theory of emotion: Gender 
differences in visceral perception. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 11(3), 199. 
64 
Petersen, S., Schroijen, M., Mölders, C., Zenker, S., & Van den Bergh, O. (2014). Categorical 
interoception perceptual organization of sensations from inside. Psychological Science, 25, 
1059-1066. doi: 10.1177/0956797613519110 
Petersen, S., van den Berg, R., Janssens, T. & Van den Bergh, O. (2011).  Illness and 
symptom perception: A theoretical approach towards an integrative measurement model. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 428-439. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2010.11.002 
Petersen, S., Van Staeyen, K., von Leupoldt, A., Vögele, C., & Van den Bergh, O. (2015b). 
Interoception and symptom reporting: Disentangling accuracy and response bias. Frontiers 
in Psychology: Consciousness Research, 6, 732. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00732. 
Petersen, S., Vögele, C., & Van den Bergh, O. (submitted). The Procrustes Effect: How 
anxiety modifies the perception of bodily sensation.  
Petersen, S., von Leupoldt, A., & Van den Bergh, O. (2015a). Interoception and the 
uneasiness of the mind: Affect as perceptual style. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1408. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01408 
Posserud, I., Svedlund, J., Wallin, J., & Simrén, M. (2009). Hypervigilance in irritable bowel 
syndrome compared with organic gastrointestinal disease. Journal of Psychosomatic 
Research, 66, 399-405. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2008.09.020 
Powell, D. J., Liossi, C., Moss-Morris, R., & Schlotz, W. (2013). Unstimulated cortisol 
secretory activity in everyday life and its relationship with fatigue and chronic fatigue 
syndrome: a systematic review and subset meta-analysis. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 38, 
2405-2422. 
Price, D. D., Riley, J. L., & Wade, J. B. (2001). Psychophysical approaches to measurement 
of the dimensions and stages of pain. In Turk, D. C. & Melzack, R. (Eds). Handbook of 
pain assessment, 2nd ed., New York, NY, US: Guilford Press, pp. 53-75. 
65 
Rief, W., & Broadbent, E. (2007). Explaining medically unexplained symptoms-models and 
mechanisms. Clinical Psychology Review, 27, 821-841. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2007.07.005 
Rief, W., & Barsky, A. J. (2005). Psychobiological perspectives on somatoform disorders. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 30, 996-1002. 
Rief, W., Hiller, W., & Margraf, J. (1998). Cognitive aspects of hypochondriasis and the 
somatization syndrome. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 587. 
Rief, W., & Martin, A. (2014). How to use the new DSM-5 somatic symptom disorder 
diagnosis in research and practice: A critical evaluation and a proposal for modifications. 
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 10, 339-367. doi: 10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-
032813-153745 
Roberts, T. A., & Pennebaker, J. W. (1994). Gender differences in perceiving internal state: 
Toward a his-and-hers model of perceptual cue use. Advances in experimental social 
psychology, 27, 143-143. 
Robbins, J. M., & Kirmayer, L. J. (1991). Attributions of common somatic symptoms. 
Psychological Medicine, 21, 1029-1045. doi: 10.1017/S0033291700030026 
Robinson, O. J., Vytal, K., Cornwell, B. R., & Grillon, C. (2013). The impact of anxiety upon 
cognition: perspectives from human threat of shock studies. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 7, 203. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00203. 
Ryan, C. M., Dulay, D., Suprasongsin, C., & Becker, D. J. (2002). Detection of symptoms by 
adolescents and young adults with type 1 diabetes during experimental enduction of mild 
hypoglycemia role of hormonal and psychological variables. Diabetes Care, 25, 852-858. 
Schaefer, M., Egloff, B., Gerlach, A. L. & Witthöft, M. (2014). Improving heartbeat 
perception in patients with medically unexplained symptoms reduces symptom distress. 
Biological Psychology, 101, 69-76. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.05.012 
66 
Schaefer, M., Egloff, B., & Witthöft, M. (2012). Is interoceptive awareness really altered in 
somatoform disorders? Testing competing theories with two paradigms of heartbeat 
perception. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121, 719-724. doi: 10.1037/a0028509 
Schandry, R., Leopold, C., & Vogt, M. (1996). Symptom reporting in asthma patients and 
insulin-dependent diabetics. Biological Psychology, 42, 231-244. doi: 10.1016/0301-
0511(95)05157-0 
Schreiber, F., Neng, J. M., Heimlich, C., Witthöft, M., & Weck, F. (2014). Implicit affective 
evaluation bias in hypochondriasis: Findings from the Affect Misattribution Procedure. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorder, 28, 671-678. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2014.07.004 
Schroeder, S., Gerlach, A. L., & Martin, A. (2014). Implicit affective evaluation of 
somatosensory sensations in patients with noncardiac chest pain. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 45, 381-388. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2014.04.002 
Schulz, A., & Vögele, C. (2015). Interoception and stress. Frontiers in psychology, 6: 993. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00993 
Schwille‐Kiuntke, J., Mazurak, N., & Enck, P. (2015). Systematic review with meta‐analysis: 
post‐infectious irritable bowel syndrome after travellers' diarrhoea. Alimentary 
Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 41, 1029-1037. doi: 10.1111/apt.13199 
Sears, S. F., Serber, E. R., Alvarez, L. G., Schwartzman, D. S., Hoyt, R. H., & Ujhelyi, M. R. 
(2005). Understanding atrial symptom reports: Objective versus subjective predictors. 
Pacing and Clinical Electrophysiology, 28, 801-807. 
Seger, C. A., & Peterson, E. J. (2013). Categorization = decision making + generalization. 
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 37, 1187-1200. 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.03.015 
67 
Seth, A. K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 17, 565-573. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., & Critchley, H. D. (2011). An interoceptive predictive coding model 
of conscious presence. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 395. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395 
Sitges, C., García-Herrera, M., Pericás, M., Collado, D., Truyols, M., & Montoya, P. (2007). 
Abnormal brain processing of affective and sensory pain descriptors in chronic pain 
patients. Journal of Affective Disorders, 104, 73-82. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2007.02.024 
Stein, M. B., Simmons, A. N., Feinstein, J. S., & Paulus, M. P. (2007). Increased amygdala 
and insula activation during emotion processing in anxiety-prone subjects. The American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 318–327. http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.164.2.318. 
Strickberger, S. A., Ip, J., Saksena, S., Curry, K., Bahnson, T. D., & Ziegler, P. D. (2005). 
Relationship between atrial tachyarrhythmias and symptoms. Heart Rhythm, 2, 125-131.        
doi:10.1016/j.hrthm.2004.10.042 
Tak, L. M., & Rosmalen, J. G. (2007). Psychoneuroendocrinology of functional somatic 
disorders. In M. T. Czerbska (ed.), Psychoneuroendocrinology Research Trends (pp. 463-
495). New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Tak, L. M., Riese, H., de Bock, G. H., Manoharan, A., Kok, I. C., & Rosmalen, J. G. (2009). 
As good as it gets? A meta-analysis and systematic review of methodological quality of 
heart rate variability studies in functional somatic disorders. Biological Psychology, 82, 
101-110. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2009.05.002 
Tak, L. M., & Rosmalen, J. G. (2010). Dysfunction of stress responsive systems as a risk 
factor for functional somatic syndromes. Journal of psychosomatic research, 68(5), 461-
468. 
68 
Tak, L. M., Cleare, A. J., Ormel, J., Manoharan, A., Kok, I. C., Wessely, S., & Rosmalen, J. 
G. (2011). Meta-analysis and meta-regression of hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis 
activity in functional somatic disorders. Biological Psychology, 87, 183-194. doi: 
10.1016/j.biopsycho.2011.02.002 
Tillisch, K., Mayer, E. A., & Labus, J. S. (2011). Quantitative meta-analysis identifies brain 
regions activated during rectal distension in irritable bowel syndrome. Gastroenterology, 
140, 91-100. doi: 10.1053/j.gastro.2010.07.053 
Tsakiris, M., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., & Costantini, M. (2011). Just a heartbeat away from one's 
body: interoceptive sensitivity predicts malleability of body-representations. Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 278(1717), 2470-2476. doi: 
10.1098/rspb.2010.2547 
Turner, D., Griffiths, A. M., Mack, D., Otley, A. R., Seow, C. H., Steinhart, A. H., Silverberg, 
M. S., Hyams, J., & Guyatt, G. H. (2010). Assessing disease activity in ulcerative colitis: 
patients or their physicians? Inflammatory Bowel Diseases, 16, 651-656. 
doi: 10.1002/ibd.21088 
Üçeyler, N., Häuser, W., & Sommer, C. (2011). Systematic review with meta-analysis: 
cytokines in fibromyalgia syndrome. BMC musculoskeletal disorders, 12, 245. doi: 
10.1186/1471-2474-12-245 
Van Cauwenbergh, D., Nijs, J., Kos, D., Weijnen, L., Struyf, F., & Meeus, M. (2014). 
Malfunctioning of the autonomic nervous system in patients with chronic fatigue 
syndrome: a systematic literature review. European journal of clinical investigation, 44, 
516-526. 
Van Damme, S., Van Hulle, L., Spence, C., Devulder, J., Brusselmans, G., & Crombez, G. 
(2014). Hypervigilance for innocuous tactile stimuli in patients with fibromyalgia: An 
experimental approach. European Journal of Pain, 19, 706-14. doi: 10.1002/ejp.593 
69 
Van De Cruys, S. (2014). To err and err, but less and less. Predictive coding and affective 
value in perception, art, and autism. Doctoral dissertation, KU Leuven.  
Van den Bergh, O., Kempynck, P. J., Van de Woestijne, K. P., Baeyens, F., & Eelen, P. 
(1995). Respiratory learning and somatic complaints: A conditioning approach using CO2-
enriched air inhalation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 517-527.        
doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)00080-4 
Van den Bergh, O., Stegen, K., & Van de Woestijne, K. P. (1997). Learning to have 
psychosomatic complaints: Conditioning of respiratory behavior and complaints in 
psychosomatic patients. Psychosomatic Medicine, 59, 13-23. 
Van den Bergh, O., Winters, W., Devriese, S., & Van Diest, I. (2002). Learning subjective 
health complaints. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 43, 147-152. doi: 10.1111/1467-
9450.00280 
Vandenbroucke, S., Crombez, G., Harrar, V., Brusselmans, G., Devulder, J., Spence, C., & 
Goubert, L. (2014). Fibromyalgia patients and controls are equally accurate in detecting 
tactile stimuli while observing another in pain: An experimental study. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 76, 2548-2559. doi: 10.3758/s13414-014-0729-9 
van der Veek, S. M., Derkx, B. H., Plak, R. D., Benninga, M. A., Boer, F., Lindauer, R. J., & 
de Haan, E. (2014). Attentional bias to activity of different parts of the body in children 
with functional abdominal pain: An experimental study. Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 
39, 438-449. doi: 10.1093/jpepsy/jsu004 
Van Dessel, N., Den Boeft, M., van der Wouden, J. C., Kleinstäuber, M., Leone, S. S., 
Terluin, B., Numans, M. E., van der Horst, H. E., & van Marwijk, H. (2014). Non-
pharmacological interventions for somatoform disorders and medically unexplained 
physical symptoms (MUPS) in adults. The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 11, 
CD011142. doi: 10.1002/14651858.CD011142.pub2. 
70 
Van Oudenhove, L., & Aziz, Q. (2013). The role of psychosocial factors and psychiatric 
disorders in functional dyspepsia. Nature Reviews Gastroenterology and Hepatology, 10, 
158-167. doi: 10.1038/nrgastro.2013.10 
Van Oudenhove, L., Vandenberghe, J., Geeraerts, B., Vos, R., Persoons, P., Fischler, B., 
Demyttenaere, K., & Tack, J. (2008). Determinants of symptoms in functional dyspepsia: 
Gastric sensorimotor function, psychosocial factors or somatisation? Gut, 57, 1666-73. doi: 
10.1136/gut.2008.158162 
Walentynowicz, M., Bogaerts, K., Van Diest, I., Raes, F., Van den Bergh, O. (2015). Was it 
so bad? The role of retrospective memory in symptom overreporting. Health Psychology, 
34, 1166-1174. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hea0000222 
Walentynowicz, M., Raes, F., Van Diest, I., & Van den Bergh, O. (2016, in press). The 
specificity of health-related autobiographical memories in patients with Somatic Symptom 
Disorder. Psychosomatic Medicine. doi: 10.1097/PSY.0000000000000357 
Watson, D., & Pennebaker, J. W. (1989). Health complaints, stress, and distress: Exploring 
the central role of negative affectivity. Psychological Review, 96, 234-254. 
Wessely, S., Nimnuan, C., & Sharpe, M. (1999). Functional somatic syndromes: One or 
many? The Lancet, 354, 936-939. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(98)08320-2 
Wessely, S., & White, P. D. (2004). In debate: there is only one functional somatic syndrome. 
The British Journal of Psychiatry, 185, 95-96. doi: 10.1192/bjp.185.2.95 
Wiech, K. (2016). Deconstructing the sensation of pain: The influence of cognitive processes 
on pain perception. Science, 354, 584-587. doi: 10.1126/science.aaf8934 
Witthöft, M., Basfeld, C., Steinhoff, M., & Gerlach, A. L. (2012). Can’t suppress this feeling: 
Automatic negative evaluations of somatosensory stimuli are related to the experience of 
somatic symptom distress. Emotion, 12, 640-649. doi: 10.1037/a0024924 
71 
Witthöft, M., Fischer, S., Jasper, F., Rist, F., & Nater, U. M. (2016). Clarifying the latent 
structure and correlates of somatic symptom distress: A bifactor model approach. 
Psychological Assessment, 28, 109:15. doi: 10.1037/pas0000150 
Witthöft, M., Gerlach, A., & Bailer, J. (2006). Selective attention, memory bias, and symptom 
perception in idiopathic environmental intolerance and somatoform disorders. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 115, 397-407. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.115.3.397 
Witthöft, M., & Hiller, W. (2010). Psychological approaches to origins and treatments of 
somatoform disorders. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 257-283. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.121208.131505 
World Health Organization (1992). The ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural 
disorders: clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines. Geneva: World Health 
Organization. 
Woud, M. L., Zhang, X. C., Becker, E. S., Zlomuzica, A., & Margraf, J. (2016). 
Catastrophizing misinterpretations predict somatoform-related symptoms and new onsets 
of somatoform disorders. Journal of psychosomatic research, 81, 31-37. 
Wright, C. E., Ebrecht, M., Mitchell, R., Anggiansah, A., & Weinman, J. (2005). The effect 
of psychological stress on symptom severity and perception in patients with gastro-
oesophageal reflux. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 59, 415-424. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychores.2005.05.012 
Yiend, J., (2010). The effects of emotion on attention: A review of attentional processing of 
emotional information. Cognition & Emotion, 24, 3-47. doi: 10.1080/02699930903205698 
Zaki, J., Davis, J. I., Ochsner, K. N. (2012). Overlapping activity in anterior insula during 
interoception and emotional experience. Neuroimage, 62, 493-499. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.05.012 
72 
Zaman, J., Vlaeyen, J. W., Van Oudenhove, L., Wiech, K., & Van Diest, I. (2015). 
Associative fear learning and perceptual discrimination: a perceptual pathway in the 
development of chronic pain. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 51, 118-125.        
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.01.009 
Zikopoulos, B., & Barbas, H. (2006). Prefrontal projections to the thalamic reticular nucleus 






Figure 1: The modal model of symptom perception. According to this model, somatic 
symptom perception starts with peripheral somatic afferent input, followed by cognitive 
processing of this input determining the degree of cognitive representation of this somatic 











Figure 2 a-c: The relationship between prior and posterior distributions in the light of new 
observations. The upper panel represents the impact of a low precision prior (light grey dotted 
line) on the posterior distribution (black) in the light of new evidence (light grey line). In this 
case of a weak prior, new information has substantial impact on the formation of a posterior 
interpretation. The middle panel represents the impact of a high precision prior distribution on 
the posterior distribution, given evidence that disconfirms the prior to some extent. The lower 
panel shows a prior that is high in precision and new observations that are inconsistent with 
the prediction but are impreciseand therefore have little impact on the subsequent posterior. 
























Figure 3: A predictive coding approach to symptom perception. In contrast to the modal 
model of symptom perception (Figure 2), within the predictive coding approach, the symptom 
perception process begins with the formation of a prior (in terms of an expectation based on 
previous symptom experience episodes). Any afferent sensory input is compared to this prior 
leading to a prediction error. As a results of error minimization processes, a symptom 
experience (a posterior) is generated that best matches the prior and the prediction error. The 
posterior serves as input determining the prior in a new symptom perception episode. 
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Table 1. Family of models explaining symptom perception, MUS and clinical manifestations by relying on peripheral somatic input interacting 
with attentional and attributional mechanisms. 
 
Authors Scope of the model Peripheral somatic input Attention Attribution and interpretation 
Pennebaker, 1982; 
Watson & Pennebaker, 
1989 
Aims to explain the 
variability in somatic 
symptoms in disease 
states as well as the 
occurrence of MUS. 
Peripheral input is necessary; 
may result from illness 
processes, from (stress-
related) arousal or be part of 
normal bodily sensations. 
Balance between externally 
and internally directed 
attention, but also beliefs 
and personality (e.g. 
negative affect) may 
determine the likelihood of 
perceiving bodily 
sensations, including 
normal bodily sensations. 
Beliefs, attributions and 
interpretations further 
determine how the sensations 
will be experienced.  
Cioffi, 1991 Aims to explain the 
variability in somatic 
interpretations in 
relation to symptoms 
and illnesses. 
Peripheral input is  
necessary; may result from 
illness processes, from 
(stress-related) arousal or be 
part of normal bodily 
sensations. 
Attention has a focus and 
direction, but also a 
content: it can be directed 
to particular prior 
hypotheses and attributions 
promoting the use of a 
specific label for the 
sensation   
The use of a label elicits other 
meanings and belief structures 
contributing to causal 
inferences and anticipated 
consequences, affecting illness 
behavior 
Leventhal & Leventhal, 
1993 
Aims to explain the 
variability in somatic 
interpretations in 
relation to symptoms 
and illnesses. 
Peripheral input is  
necessary; may result from 
physiological diseases 
processes, from (stress-
related) arousal and 
emotional distress, or be part 
Lay beliefs and illness 
representations direct 
attention to physical 
symptoms, increasing the 
chances of them being 
perceived  
Lay beliefs and illness 
representations also shape the 
attribution and interpretation 
of the sensations. 
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of normal bodily sensations. 
Barsky & Wyshak, 
1990 




Peripheral input is  
necessary; may result from 
illness processes, from 
(stress-related) arousal or be 
part of normal bodily 
sensations. 
Heightened attentional 
focus on bodily sensations 
intensifies the experience 
and leads to the perception 
of relatively weak 
sensations that normally 
remain outside of 
awareness (amplification) 
The sensations are interpreted 
as threatening and noxious, 
increasing distress, inducing 
heightened attention and 
creating a vicious circle. 
Kirmayer & Taillefer, 
1997 




Peripheral input is  
necessary; may result from 
illness processes and from 
(stress-related) arousal. 
Attentional processes 
increase chances for these 
sensations to be perceived.  
Attribution of sensations to 
illness, illness-related worries 
and concerns influence 
distress, illness behavior and 
help-seeking, which interact 
with social and cultural 
factors. The latter further 
influence coping with the 
symptoms.    
Kolk et al., 2003 Aims to explain the 
variability in somatic 
symptoms in disease 
states as well as the 
occurrence of MUS. 
Peripheral input is  
necessary; may result from 
illness processes, from 
(stress-related) arousal or be 
part of normal bodily 
sensations. 
External context, selective 
attention and negative 
affectivity may influence 
hightened attention and 
detection 
Meanings and attributions 
guided by illness beliefs and 
schemata determine the 
interpretation of the sensations 
as specific symptoms 
Brown, 2004 Aims to explain MUS 
and somatoform 
disorders 
Peripheral input is not 
necessary, chronically 
activated symptom schemata 
in an unconscious primary 
attentional system (PAS) 
In a secondary, more 
conscious attentional 
system, concerns may 
induce elevated vigilance 
for somatic sensations 
Cognitive elaborations guided 
by illness beliefs and schemata 
may further determine the 
interpretation of the symptoms 
and affect illness behavior 
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may under some 
circumstances exceed the 
awareness threshold and lead 
to conscious symptom 
experiences   
contributing to chronically 
active symptom schemata    





processes are thought to 
contribute to physical 
sensations, but they may be 
of low intensity        
A failing attentional filter 
system, to which multiple 
psychological and 
biological factors 
contribute, can cause 
subthreshold physical 
sensations to be felt  
Cognitive, behavioral and 
emotional processes become 
involved in a vicious circle 
with biological mechanisms   
Deary, et al., 2007 Aims to explain MUS 
in general with a 
specific focus also on 
CFS and IBS 
Genetic vulnerability, 
personality-related distress, 
early adverse experiences, 
life events and HPA-related 
mechanisms are considered 
underlying sources of 
somatic sensations   
Attentional biases, possible 
resulting from "cognitive 
sensitization", increase the 
probability of subthreshold 
sensations of being 
perceived.  
Illness attributions raise the 
threat value of the sensations, 
feeding back to attentional 
processes, causing behavioral 
avoidance and leading to 
escalating circles, often  
further reinforced by 
insufficient guidance and 
reassurance by health care 
workers  
Henningsen, et al., 2007 Aims to explain a large 
variety of functional 
somatic disorders (CFS, 
FM, IBS, IEI, 
nonspecific chest pain, 
and several others) 
Experience of bodily stress, 
resulting from specifiable 
biological (disease), 
psychological, interpersonal 
and/or social factors, is at the 
core 
Attentional mechanisms are 
not specified, but 
apparently implied in a 
process of interpretation of 
stress symptoms as 
symptoms of a disease 
Attribution and interpretation 
of bodily stress symptoms as 
disease may cause anxiety and 
depression, adding more 
bodily stress, stimulating 
interpretation as severe 
disease, and increasing 
emotional distress and loss of 
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functioning  
Witthöft & Hiller, 2010 Aims to explain MUS 
in general and as the 
core of somatoform 
disorders and of 
functional somatic 
disorders (CFS, FM, 
IBS, IEI). Focuses also 
on similarities and 
differences with 
hypochondriasis 
Physiological processes, as 
related to alterations in HPA-
activity and sustained 
physiological arousal may 
underlie somatic sensations, 
but also media reports, 
conditioning experiences and 
chronically activated 
memory schemata may 
contribute to MUS in the 





somatic memories increase 





importantly driven by 
neuroticism, amplify somatic 
sensations, which in turn 
inspire avoidance behaviors 
and illness interpretations. 
Inadequate response of health 
care workers may further fuel 
the impact of attentional and 
cognitive processes, including 
worry, on symptom perception 
and interpretations.    
 
 
